The
University
of Chicago
Law Review
___-Law

_Review___VOLUME

40 NUMBER 1 ]FALL 1972

Summary Action by Administrative Agencies
James 0. Freedmant
In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 51
More than 90 percent of the work of the federal administrative
agencies is done informally, without an adjudicatory hearing.' One of
the most important and least studied of the informal procedures used
by administrative agencies, both federal and state, is summary action
-sometimes called emergency action or temporary action-pending an
adjudicatory hearing. The justification for summary action lies in the
necessity for the government to act immediately-against an epidemic
of a contagious disease, against the distribution of putrid meat or
adulterated drugs, against the sale of worthless securities, against bank
officers whose conduct is jeopardizing the interests of depositors-if
public policy is to be enforced at all. If an administrative agency were
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, but responsibility for its
contents is mine. I am profoundly indebted to Louis Corsi of the Class of 1972, University
of Pennsylvania Law School, for his imaginative, devoted, and painstaking assistance.
1 See K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw TEXT § 4.01, at 88 (3d ed. 1972); K. DAvis, DIsCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 21 (1969); FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1941).
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to provide a hearing before acting in such circumstances, the attendant
delay would often render any eventual action or order ineffective to
protect the public interest. Yet the asserted factual basis for a.particular
exercise of summary authority may be quite in error, as a prior hearing
might have revealed, and the person against whom summary action is
taken may never completely recover from the drastic impact it may
have.
In weighing the need for effective administrative action against the
possibility of error in the administrative determination to act, the law
has struck the balance in favor of permitting summary action in certain
circumstances. This balance may be the only one consistent with effective public administration. But it unavoidably raises questions as to
the permissible uses and limits of summary action-as a matter of
history, as a matter of the Constitution, and as a matter of wise policy.
The use of summary procedures by the states has its roots in the
common law of nuisance. The Supreme Court, in tracing the history
of summary action, noted that "the summary abatement of nuisances
without judicial process or proceeding was well known to the common
law long prior to the adoption of the Constitution." 2 By placing this
common law authority to act against nuisances at the service of the
police power, the states were able to reach any circumstance that could
plausibly be related to the public health, safety, or morals. The result,
given the deference that nineteenth century courts paid to state exercises of the police power, was to extend summary authority to conduct
and conditions that earlier generations of common lawyers could hardly
have foreseen.
What kinds of conduct and conditions did the states' summary
authority reach? Statutes permitting the seizure and destruction of
unwholesome food, particularly meat and milk, were common,3 as
were statutes permitting the destruction of diseased animals, 4 diseased
trees, 5 and goods, such as liquor, whose use was illegal. 6 States also
2 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 13a, 142 (1894); see People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of
Health, 140 N.Y. 1, 35 N.E. 320 (1893). See generally Powell, Administrative Exercise of
the Police Power, 24 HARv. L. REv. 333, 336-38 (1911).
8 See, e.g., Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187,

82 N.E. 187 (1907).
4 See, e.g., State v. Schriber, 185 Ore. 615, 205 P.2d 149 (1949). It was a Massachusetts
statute declaring horses with the glanders to be a nuisance that gave rise to Justice
Holmes's celebrated opinion in Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
5 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 119 P. 67
(1911).
6 See, e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); People v. Diamond, 233 N.Y. 130,

135 N.E. 200 (1922).
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enacted statutes permitting the seizure of banks thought to be at the
brink of insolvency 1 the suspension of proposed utility rates and the
entry of temporary rate orders, and the demolition of houses falling to
decay or standing in the path of a conflagration. 9
While they continue to act under these and similar statutes, the most
important uses to which the states put summary action today are
probably in matters involving licensing. State agencies typically have
the authority to suspend a license summarily, pending a hearing on the
merits, when it appears that the licensee has acted in a manner that
threatens the public health or safety. Because of the many occupations
and activities subject to state licensing requirements,1 0 this authority
potentially affects a large number of citizens.
The authority of the states to act summarily has thus been as extensive as the substantive reach of the law of nuisance and of the police
power. The federal government, on the other hand, has exercised its
authority to act summarily in fewer substantive areas, primarily those
of economic regulation. Nonetheless, because of the decisive position of
federal administrative agencies in regulating the national economy,
summary action by the federal government has been at least as significant as that of the states. Various federal agencies have summary
authority to seize adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, cosmetics,
and hazardous substances;' 1 to appoint conservators to take possession
12
of banks whose financial structures are thought to be precarious;
3
to halt trading in certain securities; and to suspend many of the
7 See, e.g., State Say. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 P. 755 (1913),
aJJ'd, 238 U.S. 611 (1915). But see National Auto. Serv. Corp. v. Barfod, 289 Pa. 307, 137
A. 601 (1927).
8 See, e.g., Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939).
9 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bell, 143 Tenn. 452, 266 S.W. 207 (1920); Genesse Recreation Co.
v. Edgerton, 172 App. Div. 464, 158 N.Y.S. 421 (1916).
10 See W. GELLRoRN, INDivmuAL FREmmo An Govmunm'NrAL RErrasmrms 106 (1956); cf.
Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California,
14 STAN. L. Rzv. 533, 534 (1962).
11 Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1265 (1964), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1265 (1970); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970), amending 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964); Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 § 8(a), 21 U.S.C.
§ 372(e) (1970); Federal Meat Inspection Act §§ 3-6, 7(e), 21 U.S.C. §§ 603-06, 607(e) (1970).
12 Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 § 5(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1970), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 89-695 (Oct. 16, 1966) (appointment of a conservator or receiver subject to
judicial removal within thirty days on petition of the savings association).
I3 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(c)(5), 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(5),
78s(a)(4) (1970). The SEC's authority to enter "stop orders" against misleading registration statements may be exercised only after a hearing, Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d),
15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970), but the impact of the announcement that such a hearing will
be held has so great an effect in the marketplace that the authority is often regarded as
summary. See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); J. Lwis, THE ADMinmsTATrvE Psocrss
107-09 (1938).
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various licenses that the federal government requires to engage in
particular activities. 14 A number of federal agencies have the authority
to suspend summarily the effective date of proposed tariff schedules
submitted by carriers, 15 an authority that has been described as "one
of the most useful and important powers in the entire field of administrative regulation."'16 Finally, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
may summarily impose a jeopardy assessment, thereby permitting the
government to levy against a taxpayer's property in advance of any
adjudicatory determination that a tax is owing.17
The Constitution requires that whenever the government must provide an adjudicatory hearing for the determination of an issue, the
hearing must "be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.""' Whether the constitutional standard of meaningfulness
requires that the hearing be held before the government takes any
action is a proper subject for case-by-case determination. A number of
recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that in most circumstances
the due process requirement of a hearing can be satisfied only by a prior
hearing. 19 They suggest that many of the Court's earlier decisions
sustaining summary procedures against due process challenges rested
upon the existence of "extraordinary" 20 or "emergency" 2' 1 circumstances in which summary action was "essential to protect a vital governmental interest." 22 Part I of this article examines both the earlier
decisions sustaining the constitutionality of summary action and the
more recent decisions holding particular exercises of summary authority
'4 E.g., United States Cotton Standards Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 53 (1970); United States
Grain Standards Act § 7, 7 U.S.C. § 85 (1970); Federal Aviation Act §§ 609, 1005(a), 49
U.S.C. §§ 1429, 1485(a) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 8.28 (1971).
15 E.g., Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970); Federal Power Act § 205(e),
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1970); Intercoastal Shipping Act § 3, 46 U.S.C. § 845 (1970); Federal
Communications Act § 204, 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act §§ 15(7),
216(g), 218(c), 406(e), 907(g), 49 U.S.C. §§ 15(7), 316(g), 318(c), 1006(e), 907(g) (1970);
Federal Aviation Act § 1002, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970).
16 REPORT ON PRAcricxs AND PROCEDURPS OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION, H. R. Doc. No. 678, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1944).
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6861.
18 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
19 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
20 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); see Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
21 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
22 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 n.* (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
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unconstitutional, in an effort to identify the contemporary constitutional limits of the exception to the norm of a prior hearing.
While the courts have the power to define the constitutional limitations upon the use of summary action, the legislatures-and particularly
the Congress of the United States, with its power to occupy many
regulatory fields-have the initial responsibility to decide whether to
authorize particular agencies to act summarily in particular circumstances; and the agencies have the initial responsibility to determine
whether to exercise their summary authority in specific situations.
Part II of this article examines the performance of the federal administrative agencies in exercising summary authority and analyzes particular proposals by which Congress and the agencies can improve that
performance. It addresses the problem of controlling the use of summary authority without sacrificing its effectiveness. Part III of this
article considers the wisdom of empowering administrative agencies
to seek preliminary injunctions from the federal courts as an alternative
to authorizing them to take summary action.
I.

SUMMARY ACTION AND THE

CONSTITUTION

In determining when the Constitution should be read to permit an
administrative agency to act summarily pending an adjudicatory hearing, the courts have engaged in the intellectual process, often employed
in constitutional adjudication, of balancing one competing interest
against another, one value against another with which it conflicts. The
Supreme Court has addressed this problem in about a dozen decisions,
extending over a century and touching a wide range of substantive
concerns. Although, here as elsewhere, generalizations are hazardous,
the factors that the Court has taken into account in the process of
creating the constitutional law of summary action are susceptible to
systematic analysis.
A. The Logic of Statutory Authorization
The question of when the Constitution should be read to permit an
administrative agency to act summarily can perhaps be put with a
more useful precision: when should the Constitution be read to permit the legislature to authorize an administrative agency to act summarily? This formulation directs attention to two important threshold
considerations.
First, in considering challenges to summary action, courts properly
begin by assuring themselves that the legislature has given the agency
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statutory authority to act summarily. 23 Administrative agencies exercise
delegated powers. The question of what powers the legislature has
delegated to an agency is never a matter of indifference, either to the
legislature, the agency, or those subject to the agency's regulatory jurisdiction, particularly when the powers in issue are significant. The
power to act summarily is a drastic and sensitive one, akin to the injunctive power of a court; it is granted to agencies, usually those
having the confidence of the legislature, only for the performance of a
limited number of tasks. Given the political process by which administrative agencies are brought to birth and the drastic nature of the
power to act summarily, it is justifiable to assume that a legislature's
failure to delegate summary authority was not inadvertent. Whatever
arguments can be made in favor of implying the existence in an agency
of particular powers not expressly or precisely delegated, they are not
24
appropriate to the power to act summarily.
Moreover, any assertion of authority to act summarily potentially
presents questions of constitutional dimension, particularly with respect to the limitations summary action may impose on the right to a
hearing. By enforcing a requirement of statutory authorization, courts
insure that they will confront these questions only when the legislature
has focused upon them as a matter of policy and has unambiguously
elected to present them.25 Courts thereby avoid imputing to the legislature the intention to enact laws presenting serious constitutional
questions when the legislature's intention is far from clear. 26 The
23 See, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 306 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Nebraska
Dep't of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962). Agencies asserting the power to
act summarily without statutory authorization have been rebuffed by the courts. See, e.g.,
Kirby v. Shaw, 358 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1966); Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18
(D.C. Cir. 1949); cf. Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime B, 302 F.2d
875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (agency sought to establish that Congress had granted it
statutory authority to act summarily, rather than asserting that such authority was unnecessary; summary order set aside for want of authority). But cf. Silver v. McCamey, 221
F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
24 Cf. L.P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 898 (1944). It is doubtful, therefore,
whether a statute authorizing an agency "to promulgate regulations for [its] efficient
enforcement," Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(a), 21 US.C. § 371(a) (1970), can
properly be construed by an agency to authorize regulations providing for summary
license suspensions. But see id. and 21 C.F.R. § 8.28 (1971); Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970) and 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1971).
25 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Freedman, The Uses and Limits of Remand in Administrative Law: Staleness of the
Record, 115 U. PA. L. RLv. 145, 152-57 (1966).
26 See, e.g., Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S. Ct. 768 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1954) (refusal to

infer Post Office authority to impound mail summarily pending a hearing on mail fraud
charges in light of the "constitutional implications" of such authority); A. BicaurL, THE
LEAsT DANGmmous BRANCH 111-98 (1962).
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requirement of statutory authorization thus allows the courts both to
respect the legislature's prerogative and to enforce its responsibility of
initial decision in matters likely to have a constitutional dimension. It
also serves to maintain the integrity of the judicial process by avoiding
premature adjudication of constitutional questions.
Second, the fact that the legislature, after weighing the need for
prompt action against the protections afforded by a prior hearing, has
authorized an administrative agency to act summarily often seems
itself to be a persuasive element in the judicial determination that the
authorization is constitutional. 27 For example, in North American Cold
Storage Co. v. Chicago,28 the Supreme Court said:
What is the emergency which would render a hearing unnecessary? We think when the question is one regarding the destruction
of food which is not fit for human use the emergency must be one
which would fairly appeal to the reasonable discretion of the
legislature as to the necessity for a prior hearing, and in that case
its decision would not be a subject for review by the courts. 29
It is clearly appropriate for courts to respect a legislative judgment
that, on the balance of risks, summary action is necessary for effective
administrative regulation, if only because the legislature is more likely
to be adequately informed on such matters than a court. At the same
time, however, reliance on the legislature's judgment would have too
much the quality of bootstrapping if it were permitted to do service
by itself. A recent series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has
held certain summary procedures unconstitutional suggests that statutory authorization, taken alone, is not dispositive of the question of
constitutionality. That question requires reference to standards that
are in the ultimate keeping of courts; there remains the eminently
judicial task of inquiring into the asserted justification for each statutory grant of summary authority.
B.

Situations Justifying Summary Action

An understanding of the circumstances in which summary action is
constitutionally permissible must begin by recognizing the historic
role in our legal system of adversary hearings in resolving factual
27 See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 594 (1931); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC,
299 F.2d 127, 132-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
28 211 U.S. 806 (1908).
29 Id. at 320; see Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Nor-Am
Agricultural Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert.
dismissed, 402 US. 935 (1971); Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLB,
262 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1958).
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disputes. Adversary hearings, held on the record after notice and opportunity for participation by all interested parties, permit intensive
examination of the factual assertions of the parties, particularly by the
classic means of confrontation and cross-examination, and are plainly
superior to ex parte proceedings in their capacity for ascertaining truth
and reducing the possibility of error.3 0 This at least has been our faith,
particularly when the protection of important interests has been at
stake.3 1 That faith-based, too, on the desire that justice appear to
have been done-has found expression in statutes requiring administrative hearings and in a steady line of judicial decisions requiring
administrative agencies to provide adversary hearings with respect to
32
a widening range of governmental actions.
There is, however, no rule of constitutional law requiring in absolute terms that a constitutionally compelled hearing always be a
prior hearing. Language in several Supreme Court decisions can arguably be read to suggest that whenever due process requires a hearing
it requires a prior hearing.33 The context of that language, however,
indicates that, almost certainly, it was not intended to carry such
weight, and, in any event, the language is inconsistent with the holdings
of a number of important decisions. 4 Rather, what the Constitution
does require, as Armstrong v. Manzo3 5 held, is that a constitutionally
compelled hearing "be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,"38 a standard that counsels a prudential inquiry case-bycase.3 7
30 For a full discussion of the values served by adversary hearings, see Kadish,
Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE

L.J. 319 (1957).
31 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-84 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32 See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Willner v. Committee on Character
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Dixon v. Alabama State Ed. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
83 See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938); Garfield v. United
States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908); cf. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385
(1908) (hearing required before taking action "irrevocably").
34 See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519-21 (1944); Yakus v. United States,
321 US. 414, 436 (1944).
35 380 US. 545 (1965).
86 Id. at 552.
37 The "meaningful time" standard also indicates some qualification of Chief Justice
Stone's declaration that "[t]he demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the
initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative
proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective." Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152 (1941). The Chief Justice's
statement has usually been taken to mean that it is not of constitutional significance
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Although the constitutional requirement of a prior hearing is not
absolute, it is no less clear that prior hearings have come to be regarded
as the norm. Recently, in Bell v. Burson,8 Justice Brennan, speaking
for a unanimous Court, asserted as "fundamental" that "except in
emergency situations ... due process requires that when a State seeks
to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford
'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case' before the termination becomes effective."8 9 It is fair to say,
therefore, that when the Constitution requires a hearing, an adminis=
trative agency may be authorized to act summarily in advance of that
hearing only in "emergency situations" that are themselves constitutionally defined. The question, then, becomes what constitutes an
"emergency situation" within the constitutional meaning of the term.40
1. Protecting the National Security During Wartime. War is the
dearest example of an emergency situation in the life of a nation.
When the United States has faced the extremity of war, Congress has
enacted laws providing for summary procedures in the regulation of
significant areas of the economy, and the Supreme Court-perhaps
mindful of Hamilton's ironic vision of "the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen-that of a nation incapacitated by its
Constitution to prepare for defence" 4 -has sustained them.
Thus, in Stoehr v. Wallace,42 a case involving World War I legislation, the Court upheld the constitutional authority of Congress to
permit the summary seizure of "property believed to be enemywhether the constitutionally required hearing is given at the administrative level, Brown
v. United States, 367 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 917 (1967), or by
de novo review in court, Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Jordan v. American
Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See generally United States v. Illinois
Cent. Ry., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701,
708-11 (1884); 1 K. DAvis, AmINIsTRAT v lAw TREATISE § 7.10, at 448, 450 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ADMINisTRATnE LAw TREATIsE].
38 402 US. 535 (1971).
89 Id. at 542 (emphasis in original); see O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied:
The Welfare PriorHearing Cases, 1970 SUP. CT. REv. 161, 169.

40 Analogies to commonplace stages of the criminal process, such as the return of an
indictment, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 US. 594, 599 (1950), or the denial
of bail, Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 250 n.10 (1968)

(Stewart, J., dissenting), are misleading insofar as they suggest that "emergency situations" may be of an equally commonplace character. Cf. United States v. Harper, 335 F.
Supp. 904, 906 (D. Mass. 1971) (dictum), vacated as moot, 406 US. 940 (1972). Those
analogies draw upon practices with distinctive historical roots, Jenkins v. McKeithen,
895 U.S. 411, 430 (1969); they are not helpful in assessing the constitutional meaning of
words drawn from a different historical context.
41 Tm FEomAxsr No. 25, at 156 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
42 255 U.S. 239 (1921); accord, Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[4o: 1

owned" 43 so long as provision was made for an eventual hearing. The
provision for a subsequent hearing was found constitutionally adequate
because it reserved to the claimant the right to establish his claim at a
full judicial hearing, "unembarrassed by the precedent executive determination." 44
A generation later, in Bowles v. Willingham, 5 the Court considered
the constitutionality of a provision in the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 authorizing the Price Administrator to establish maximum
rents by order and without a hearing. The Court rejected the constitutional challenge in strong terms:
Congress was dealing here with the exigencies of wartime conditions and the insistent demands of inflation control.... National
security might not be able to afford the luxuries of litigation and
the long delays which preliminary hearings traditionally have entailed.
. ..
[W here Congress has provided for judicial review after
the regulations or orders have been made effective it has done all
that due process under the war emergency requires.4"
One of the central considerations in the Court's reasoning was
the fact that the 1942 Act allowed the landlord to seek a subsequent
judicial determination of his claim. The Act, however, allowed the
courts to review the Price Administrator's decision only for arbitrariness; 47 it did not provide a plenary judicial hearing of the kind approved in Stoehr v. Wallace. Although the judicial review provided
by the 1942 Act was thus more restricted than that available in earlier
cases sustaining summary procedures, a fact that would seem relevant
to the constitutional adequacy of the legislative scheme, 48 the Court
took no note of the distinction.
43 World War I statutes providing for summary seizure of property are collected in
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 553 nn.1-2 (1921).
44 255 US. at 246.
45 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
46 Id. at 520-21; see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944). Congress's
concern that prior hearings might hamper the rent control program seems to have been
borne out by subsequent developments: in the first four years of the program, landlords
filed 1,340,955 petitions for rent adjustments, each seeking an individual determination.
W. GELLHoRN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE IAW, CASES AND CoMMENTS 495 n.7 (5th ed.
1970). In light of the volume of cases, the administrative appeals machinery made available by OPA, and the opportunity for judicial review, the Court might well have held
summary determination of maximum rents constitutional even in the absence of war. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union v.

Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971).
47 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204(b), 56 Stat. 31, as amended, Act
of June 30, 1944, ch. 325, § 107, 58 Stat. 639, 50 App. U.S.C. § 924(b) (Supp. IV, 1945).
48 See 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATisE, supra note 37, § 7.10, at 450 (1958); cf.
Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 US. 25 (1971).
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-That Congress has acted pursuant to the war power, the Supreme
Court once said, "does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." 49 But it inevitably conditions the attitude that
the Court takes in deciding whether the balance that Congress has
struck on an issue such as the substitution of summary for plenary
administrative hearings is constitutional.5 0 In Stoehr and in Willingham,
the Court doubtless realized that the exigencies of wartime conditions
were bound to infect many summary seizures of property and many
summary establishments of maximum rents with serious error, but it
was not prepared to interfere with Congress's discharge of its responsibilities during a grave national emergency.
Perhaps one cannot expect a court to undertake a skeptical balancing
of the gains and losses from the use of summary procedures when
Congress and the President, answerable to history for preserving the
safety of the nation, have deemed them necessary to the successful conduct of the war effort. This suggests that decisions of the Supreme
Court sustaining the constitutionality of summary administrative procedures enacted pursuant to the war powers should not be taken to
mean that the same result would follow in time of peace. Justice
Holmes made the point with characteristic felicity: "A limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be
'
upheld as a permanent change."51
2. Protecting the Federal Government's Revenues. The tax laws of
the United States have long permitted the collection of the internal
revenue by the summary administrative method of jeopardy assessments.52 Because the usual methods of tax assessment and collection are
deliberate, the delay attendant to their use may sometimes result in
frustration of the government's proper claim, particularly when a
taxpayer is wasting or concealing his assets or otherwise engaging in
49 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (footnote omitted);
cf. Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 24-27 (1970).
50 Legislation enacted under the war power "is executed in a time of patriotic fervor
that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by the judges under
the influence of the same passions and pressures." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
51 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921); see Chastelton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543
(1924); P. WOLL, ADMINISTRATivE LAw, THE INFORMAL PROCEss 33 (1963); Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative Law, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 552, 566 (1950).
52 The present provision permits the Commissioner to assess a deficiency against a taxpayer and make demand for payment whenever he "believes that the assessment or
collection of a deficiency . . . will be jeopardized by delay .... ." INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6861(a); see J. CmoMm:, THE LAw OF FEDELA INCOME TAXATION§ 260 (1968).
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fraud 5 3 The jeopardy assessment insures that if the government's claim
is sustained, there will be assets from which it can be paid: unless the
assessed taxpayer makes payment of the alleged deficiency or stays
collection by filing a bond to insure payment, 54 the government may
proceed to collect the tax by distraint.5
The jeopardy assessment is a drastic remedy, capable of imposing
hardships that might have been demonstrated, had a hearing been held,
to be unnecessary or disproportionate to the apparent exigencies of the
moment. In order to make a jeopardy assessment, the Commissioner
need only "believe" that collection of the tax will be jeopardized by
delay-a judgment not subject to judicial review.5 6 Yet a taxpayer
whose assets are frozen because he is unable to furnish a bond 57 may be
disabled from carrying on his business and enjoying his ordinary style
of life. The impact of a jeopardy assessment is intensified by the fact
that the Commissioner often determines the amount of the assessment
in haste58 and has a tendency to overassess in order to protect the
government against all possible losses.59
By what reasoning does the Constitution permit the use of procedures
that can have such harsh results? In the leading case of Phillips v.
Commissioner," the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
summary tax collection procedures as both long-accepted and necessary.61 The Court's assertion, documented extensively in the margins
53 See

B. BrrsTaa & L.

STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GISr TAXATION

935 (4th ed.

1972).
54 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6863(a).
55 9 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATiON § 49.149 (rev. ed. 1965). In

certain circumstances, the taxpayer's property may be sold prior to a hearing on the merits
of either the government's claim or the taxpayer's defenses. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6863(b)(3).
55 Brown-Wheeler Co., 21 B.TA. 755 (1930); see Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d
645 (7th Cir. 1957). For an argument that the Commissioner's decision to make a
jeopardy assessment should be subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion, see
Kaminsky, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 14 TAx L. Rav. 545 (1959).
57 See Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (dictum); 9 J.
MaRTENS, supra note 55, § 49.149 n.61, at 236. The right to file a bond to stay collection
of a jeopardy assessment has been called an "ephemeral remedy" because few sureties will
insure payment of a jeopardy assessment. Gould, Jeopardy Assessments: When They May
Be Levied and What to Do About Them, N.Y.U. l8TH INst. ON FED. TAX. 937, 944-45
(1960).
58 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 55, § 49.144, at 231.
59 B. Brrram & L. STONE, supra note 53, at 935. The Commissioner may make an
assessment in an amount greater than that stated in the notice of deficiency and abate
an assessment "to the extent that he believes [it] to be excessive in amount." INT. R V.
CODE OF 1954, § 6861(c).
60 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
61 Id. at 595-97.
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of Justice Brandeis's opinion, that the government's right to use summary administrative procedures in the collection of tax revenues "has
long been settled" and "consistently sustained" was not an overstatement: the constitutionality of such procedures was sustained as
early as 1856 in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co. 62 But while summary tax collection procedures may make legitimate claim to an historic standing, and the result in Phillips v. Commissioner may be explained in part by the Supreme Court's willingness
to honor that claim, the Court sought to rely on more than the normative power of history. The result was plainly meant to rest in considerable part upon what the Court called "the need of the government
promptly to secure its revenues. 0 83
The government's need to collect tax revenues promptly, even when
coupled with an appeal to history, is not adequate to support the result
the Court reached. The question is not whether such a governmental
need exists and is significant. Rather, it is whether the governmental
need is of a character and weight sufficient to justify in constitutional
terms the severe injury that summary administrative procedures can
impose upon the taxpayer. The Court did not undertake to answer that
question. Instead, it simply observed that "[d]elay in the judicial
determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential
that governmental needs be immediately satisfied."64 Yet the cases cited
by the Court to support this observation-cases involving hazards to
the public health, wartime threats to national security, and the power
of eminent domain-are not obviously apposite. Public health hazards
and wartime threats to national security are among the most serious
perils a society faces, while the power of eminent domain is itself the
product of a special historical development. The fact that "only property rights" 65 may be involved-although that is hardly the most
sympathetic characterization of the values asserted by the taxpayerdoes not distinguish summary tax collection procedures from others
involving property rights in which summary process would not be
constitutional. Nor would the fact that the taxpayer is allowed a subsequent judicial determination of his rights by itself usually justify
62

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856); cf. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 324 (1970)

(noting that the statute giving the federal government's claim for unpaid taxes priority
in a Chapter X reorganization "has existed almost unchanged since 1797, and its historical
roots reach back to the similar priority of the Crown in England, an aspect of the royal
prerogative, founded upon a policy of protecting public revenues").
63 283 U.S. at 596.
64 Id. at 597.
65 Id.

at 596.
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summary procedures, although it would doubtless be entitled to weight
in a reasoned inquiry into the balance of competing claims. 66
Perhaps after a more careful inquiry, marked by a systematic attempt
to balance the government's need to act summarily against the impact
that jeopardy assessments can have on taxpayers, the Court in Phillips
would have reached the same result. The Court might have concluded,
for example, that effective administration of a tax system in a nation
this large depends upon a norm of voluntary and prompt payment by
the overwhelming number of taxpayers, and that use of the jeopardy
assessment is essential if that norm is to be fostered and maintained.
On the other hand, the Court might have concluded that alternate
methods of enforcement could achieve the same result without such
drastic consequences for the taxpayer.67 In either event, a systematic
inquiry would have exposed the reasoning that led to the result and
thereby served better to illuminate the constitutional law of summary
action. Perhaps summary procedures have become so traditional in
the collection of tax revenues that their consistency with due process
is not seen as presenting a difficult question. However, as Justice
Holmes once commented: "Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such an extent that we even are in danger of making the role
of history more important than it is."68
3. Protecting the Public Against Economic Injury. When the government acts summarily in tax matters, it does so to protect its own
position as collector of the internal revenue. Constitutional questions
are presented as well when the government acts summarily to protect
the public against imminent economic injury, as when the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, without notice or hearing, appoints a conservator to enter into possession of a bank 69 whose management it believes to be "pursuing a course injurious to, and jeopardizing the
70
interests of, its members, creditors and the public."
The arguments supporting a constitutional right to a prior hearing
in these circumstances are straightforward. The Board's decision to
66 See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 US. 593, 896 (1984): "It is [constitutionally] enough
that all available defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of
the tax and before the command of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable."
Cf. L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACION 383-84 (1965).
67 See Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (SD. Fla. 1957).
66 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in CoLLEcmD IEGAL PAPERs 191 (1920).
69 Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 § 5(d), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1946).
70 Fahey v. Mallonee, 882 U.S. 245, 247 (1947). Illustrative state court decisions include
Financial Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 895, 289 P.2d 283 (1955), and State
Say. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 487, 182 P. 755 (1918), af'd, 288 U.S. 611
(1915).
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appoint a conservator tenders factual issues-about the character and
quality of the bank's management and the potential for harm to the
banking public-of a kind that have traditionally required an adversary hearing for their resolution.71 Moreover, the seizure of a bank and
ouster of its management have such serious consequences for all concerned that a prior hearing might reasonably be required as an essential safeguard against error, especially since the Board's determination
to appoint a conservator is not subject to an anticipatory injunction 72
and may not be reviewed for abuse of discretion until an administrative
hearing on the merits has been concluded.73
These arguments in favor of a constitutional right to a prior hearing,
persuasive as they may be in other contexts, did not prevail in Fahey v.
Mallonee7 4 in which the Court held that the summary authority given
to the Board in 1933 was constitutional "in the light of the history and
customs of banking." 75 Congress was obviously aware that incompetence
and malfeasance in the administration of a bank could precipitate its
collapse, which in turn could present grave dangers to a community.
The solvency of perhaps scores of creditors and the life savings of tens
of thousands of depositors could be destroyed by what the Court called
"problems of insecurity and mismanagement."76 By empowering the
Board to appoint a conservator when substantial questions of malfeasance or incompetence were raised about a bank's management,
Congress sought to avert real and serious dangers.
In acting to protect the public interest against the threat of a bank's
collapse, Congress also attempted to accommodate the banking community's interest in the continued functioning of the bank until final
disposition of the charges. When the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
71 See 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 37, § 7.08, at 438.

72 Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 262 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1958);
Hykel v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
73 Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 162 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959).
74 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
75 Id. at 254. The quoted phrase brings to mind the Court's reliance on tradition in
Phillips v. Commissioner. See text and notes at notes 60-62 supra. The importance of long
usage as a factor in the reasoning by which the constitutionality of summary action is
upheld was made express in an earlier decision that sustained a summary procedure by
which the state took custody of abandoned bank deposits: "The fact that a procedure is
so old as to have become customary and well known in the community is of great weight
in determining whether it conforms to due process, for 'Not lightly vacated is the verdict
of quiescent years.'" Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 US. 233, 244 (1944), quoting
from Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928) (Cardozo, J.),

afJ'd, 280 U.S. 218 (1930); see First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.

1965).
76 332 U.S. at 250.
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appoints a conservator, it does so not to put a banking institution out
of business, but rather to permit it to continue in business under a
management whose competence and honesty are free from doubt. As
one court said, "this temporary supersession involves no liquidation,
no alteration of existing interests, and no discontinuity in the business
of the [bank], but only a substitution pendente lite of the Board's representative for the directors and officers of the [bank] in the control
and management of its affairs." 77 Appointment of a conservator, although a "drastic procedure," may thus be the most appropriate way
in which to protect the interests of both the public and the bank.
The question remains, however, why the administrative hearing on
the issues of incompetence and malfeasance should not come before,
rather than after, appointment of a conservator. The answer lies in the
realities of the situation. The bank might well be insolvent long before
a prior hearing could be concluded.7 8 If the hearing were held in private, depositors and creditors would continue to entrust their money
to a bank that the federal authorities believed might be unable to meet
its obligations. A prior hearing would thus be of small value. On the
other hand, the delay and publicity that would accompany a public
hearing could be fatal to preservation of the banking institution as a
going business and destructive of the position of depositors and creditors for whose protection the Board is responsible. The summary
action upheld in Fahey v. Mallonee was, therefore, truly a response to
an emergency situation: appointment of a conservator can effectively
protect the interests of depositors and creditors and of the banking
institution only if it can be done summarilyY9
4. Protecting the Public Health against Impure Foods and Drugs.
Protection of the public health against the dangers posed by impure
foods and drugs has in this century become a standard governmental
function, and summary procedures have become one of the standard
means by which to carry it out. In the early case of North American
77 Greater Del. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 262 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.
1958).
78 This is doubtless what the Court had in mind when it referred to "the delicate nature
of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit during an investigaton." 332
U.S. at 253.
79 In the related context of summary suspension of a broker-dealer's exemption from
the full registration requirements of the federal securities laws, the District of Columbia
Circuit cited Fahey v. Mallonee for the proposition that summary action may be taken
where the public harm from failure so to act will exceed the private harm that summary
action may inflict. R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962); see Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 212 Wis. 184, 193,
248 N.W. 458, 461 (1983).
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Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,s0 the Court sustained the constitutionality
of an Illinois statute permitting health inspectors to enter cold storage
houses and "forthwith seize, condemn and destroy any such putrid,
decayed, poisoned and infected food, which any such inspector may
find in and upon such premises." The decision relied heavily on the
state's authority to abate a nuisance:
We are of opinion, however, that provision for a hearing before
seizure and condemnation and destruction of food which is unwholesome and unfit for use, is not necessary.... Food that is in
such a condition, if kept for sale or in danger of being sold, is in
itself a nuisance, and a nuisance of the most dangerous kind, involving, as it does, the health, if not the lives, of persons who may
eat it.81

The state clearly has a significant interest in protecting "the lives
and health of its inhabitants,"8 21 and summary destruction of food unfit
for human consumption is plainly an effective means of doing so. But
what if the inspector errs, and orders the destruction of food that in
fact is not unfit for human consumption? The Court in North American Cold Storage found that the possibility of such error did not affect
the constitutionality of the statute because a party whose property was
mistakenly destroyed could recover in an action at law. The adequacy
of a subsequent remedy in damages was, however, questionable. As the
cold storage company argued, when the state destroyed the food it had
seized, it also destroyed the only possible evidence of wholesomeness.
The difficult question, therefore, is not whether summary seizure is
supportable as an emergency measure-surely it is when one considers
the serious injury that putrid food can inflict on large numbers of
persons-but whether summary destruction is warranted.
The problem created by summary destruction for an owner who asserts the fitness of his food could be avoided in some cases by requiring
that, whenever possible, the food be preserved either until a hearing
can be held or at least until the owner's experts can examine it.83 That
procedure would protect the public health and, at the same time, preserve the property owner's right to make a meaningful presentation on
the merits and to regain his property if successful.8 4 Given the possibils0 211 U.S. 806 (1908).
81

Id. at 315.

82

Id.

83 Indeed, in North American Cold Storage, the owner maintained that the condemned
poultry would have continued in the same condition, if properly stored, for three months.
Id. at 320.
84 See
STATES

J.

DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JuSTICE AND TnE SUPREMACY OF LAw IN THE UNnrm

255-56 (1927). The Court dismissed the company's argument that destruction was
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ity of thus accommodating both parties' interests, what emergency remained to justify the constitutionality of summary destruction?
The Court's response indicated its concern that preservation of the
seized food, although less drastic than destruction, might also be less
effective. The food might be tampered with or distributed to the public
by accident or by intentional evasion. 5 Therefore, as the Court concluded, the legislature might plausibly believe that preservation itself
constituted a serious threat to public health. 6 The Court in North
American Cold Storage thus deferred to the legislature's judgment
that, in the particular emergency confronting health inspectors, no
remedy less drastic than destruction can be an effective means of pro87
tecting the public health.
The degree to which the Court remains prepared to defer to legislative judgments authorizing summary action arguably concerned with
public health is illustrated by the leading case of Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry, Inc.88 The Food and Drug Administration, with the
approval of the Attorney General, had made eleven summary seizures 9
of a food supplement that it believed to be misbranded. In sharp contrast to the state's rationale for acting summarily in North American
Cold Storage, no claim was made that the product was dangerous or in
improper because decayed foods have value for certain purposes. 211 U.S. at 321. Federal

legislation that authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to detain for twenty days any
meat or poultry product that he has reason to believe is misbranded or adulterated
requires that he preserve the product pending in rem condemnation proceedings or other
action. See Poultry Products Inspection Act § 19, 21 U.S.C. § 467a (1970); Federal Meat
Inspection Act § 402, 21 U.S.C. § 672 (1970).
85

211 U.S. at 320.

86 Id.
87 Cf. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913), sustaining the constitutionality of an
ordinance providing for the summary destruction of milk brought into the city without
having been tested for tuberculosis and other contagious diseases. The Court concluded
that the legislature could properly believe that preservation of uninspected milk, until
it could be inspected, was impractical, but it did so only after evaluating the alternatives
itself. Similar demonstrations of the limited scope of extraordinary governmental action
are often required, under various rhetorical formulae, even as courts are upholding the
action. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 US. 272, 278-79 (1928) ("the only practicable
method of controlling the disease'); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231
(1821) ("least possible power adequate to the end proposed'); Tippett v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153, 1160 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, would require "the least
drastic departure" from constitutional norms); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 547, 26
N.E. 100, 102 (1891) (Holmes, J., would require "actual necessity').
88 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
89 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 304(a), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (Supp. HI, 1950), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1970) (multiple seizures authorized on probable cause to
believe "the misbranded article is dangerous to health, or that the labeling of the misbranded article is fraudulent, or would be in a material respect misleading to thae
injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer').
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any way harmful to health; as the trial court found, it was "at worst,
harmless" 90 and would do the public no good.91
The distributor of the product, seeking to enjoin the seizures as unconstitutional, argued that no emergency existed to justify the hardship
and destructive publicity caused by the multiple summary seizures.
Although the Court recognized that multiple seizures "can cause irreparable damage to a business" 92 and that the preparation in question
"may be relatively innocuous," 93 it nevertheless sustained the constitutionality of the summary seizure provision:
[Congress] may conclude, as it did here, that public damage may
result even from harmless articles if they are allowed to be sold
as panaceas for man's ills. A requirement for a hearing, as a matter
of constitutional right, does not arise merely because the danger
of injury may be more apparent or immediate in the one case than
in the other. For all we know, the most damage may come from
misleading or fraudulent labels. That is a decision for Congress,
not for us. 94
Because the food supplement presented no apparent threat to the
public health, the Court's readiness to sustain the constitutionality of
summary seizure on public health grounds is difficult to accept. Nonetheless, the Court has continued to point to the decision as an example
of an emergency situation in which summary action is permissible. 95
In doing so, the Court may be looking to the consumer protection
rather than the public health aspects of the case. On that basis, Mytinger & Casselberry can be thought to go beyond North American
Cold Storage in the deference shown the legislature since, without
analyzing the nature of the consumer protection emergency to which
Congress might have been responding, the Court said that "[t]here is
no constitutional reason why Congress in the interests of consumer
protection may not extend [the] area""" in which summary seizure may
be taken. Because of the apparent casualness with which the result was
reached, it may be incautious to impute to the decision the broad
holding that this statement suggests.
90 339 U.S. at 604 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

91 The supplement was described as "an encapsulated concentrate of alfalfa, water
cress, parsley, and synthetic vitamins combined in a package with mineral tablets." 339
Us. at 596.
92 Id. at 599. See also Lev, The Multiple Seizure Bludgeon, 5 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 555

(1950).
93 Id. at 601.
94 Id. at 600.
95 See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 555, 545 n.5 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254,
263 n.10 (1970).
96 339 US. at 600.
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The Court in Mytinger & Casselberry did not indicate that the legislature is required to select the least drastic remedy consistent with an
effective response to the emergency confronting it. But the decision
should not be read to extend the constitutionally permissible scope
of summary action. For as the Court noted, 97 the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act authorizes summary seizure only with the approval of the
Attorney General.98 The Court may well have been persuaded that, by
building this procedural safeguard into the administrative process by
which summary authority may be exercised, Congress had satisfied the
requirements of due process. 99
C.

Situations Not Justifying Summary Action

The classic decisions sustaining the constitutionality of summary
action suggest the significance that the Supreme Court has attached to
legislative decisions that summary procedures are necessary for effective
governmental action. In several recent decisions, however, the Court
has shown its willingness to override a legislative decision authorizing
summary procedures when the facts do not make out an "emergency"
or "extraordinary" situation in the sense required by the Constitution.
The most important of these decisions is Goldberg v. Kelly, 100 which
held unconstitutional the summary termination or suspension of welfare benefits under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children. Because the administrative scheme challenged in that case provided for a "fair hearing" after the termination
of benefits, the question whether due process required a prior hearing
was squarely presented.
The Court recognized at the outset the impact that summary termination of benefits has on an eligible recipient: "[t]ermination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.
Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate."' 0'1 The Court went on to find two other factors basic
to its decision.
97 Id. at 599.
98 21 U.S.C. § 337 (1946), as amended, 21 U.S.C.

§ 337 (1970); cf. Helco Prods. Co. v.
McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
99 At least one court has held in similar circumstances that the subsequent judicial
determinatioxi must arise from "a de novo proceeding in the district court rather than
from some lesser process merely involving judicial review of the administrative determination." SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 461 F.2d 974, 979 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1972); Greenawalt,
All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. Cr.
RJV. 31, 43-44.
100 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
101 Id. at 264 (emphasis in original).
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First, in cases in which subsequent hearings were held, decisions to
terminate benefits were reversed with great frequency-according to
one study, in over half the cases. 102 It may be that those persons who persevered to the conclusion of the hearing process were not a representative group. Nonetheless, the incidence of error was sufficiently high to
warrant the Court's concern with the use of summary procedures,
given "the welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility." 10 3
Second, very few decisions to terminate welfare payments-perhaps
one percent-were, in fact, appealed to subsequent hearings.104 As the
Court suggested, this may have been in part because the recipient's
"need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence"
after his benefits have been terminated "adversely affects his ability to
seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy."' 105
In light of the sobering import of these figures--that posttermination hearings cannot be expected to protect eligible welfare recipients
against erroneous terminations-what countervailing governmental
interests could justify the use of summary action? The government's
argument that summary action "conserves both the fisc and administrative time and energy"'' 0 6 was properly rejected-07 The government's
interest in protecting its purse, although a legitimate one, is hardly
102 See Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-The
Wisconsin Experience, 43 Soc. SEav. REv. 12, 22 (1969); cf. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S.
208, 221 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (official figures of a similar magnitude for reversals
of suspensions of disability benefits under the Social Security Act).
103 397 U.S. at 264 n.12; see Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance:
Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. Rv.1307,
1326-27 (1967).
104 Bell & Norvell, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TEx. L. REV. 223, 233
(1967); Burrus & Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience, 16 AM. U.L. REV.
199, 213 (1967); Handler, supra note 102, at 20; Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The
Right to a PriorHearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234, 1244 (1967).
105 397 U.S. at 264; see O'Neil, supra note 39, at 172. In addition, "[t]he welfare
recipient may be illiterate; he may not understand how to obtain a hearing; he may
regard welfare as charity and not realize that it may be asserted as a right; he may
believe that requesting a hearing would damage his interests by angering the social worker,
or he may be afraid to attend the hearing." Comment, The Constitutional Minimum for
the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a PriorHearing,
68 MmH. L. Rav. 112, 130-31 (1969); see Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of
the Public Welfare System, 54 CALiu. L. REe. 370 (1966); Handler & Hollingsworth,
Stigma, Privacy and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
106 897 U.S. at 265.
107 Id. at 266. For a suggestion that the Court rejected the state's argument too quickly,
without adequately considering the costs that pretermination hearings would impose upon
state welfare administrations, see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 -1ARv. L. Ray. 30,
10-1-05 (1970).
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comparable to those that the Court has found adequate to sustain summary action in the true emergency cases. The payment of welfare benefits to persons subsequently found ineligible threatens no harm to the
public health or safety or to national security, inflicts no economic
injury on a specific group, and does not compromise the performance
of a vital governmental function.0 In addition, in a humane scheme
of constitutional values, conservation of the government's resources
surely is not entitled to as much weight as "the individual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of
assistance '109 until a hearing can be completed, particularly when no
adequate remedy exists to correct the high incidence of error in termination decisions. 10 In these circumstances, the rule of Armstrong v.
Manzol" that constitutionally required hearings must "be granted at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"-12 could be met only
1 3
by a pretermination hearing.

In another significant decision, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.," 4
108 The state may constitutionally recoup welfare benefits improperly continued. Snell
v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 323 (1969).
109 Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
110 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 H-Iv. L R v. 1439, 1454 (1968): "Although the right to some form of process may
be absolute, the extent to which particular safeguards are available nonetheless varies according to the circumstances. Where the consequence of error is relatively insubstantial,
protection against the risk of error through the use of elaborate quasi-judicial procedures
is subject to a constitutional trade-off with the need for administrative and fiscal
economy." See also Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 CALrr. L.
REV. 215, 228 (1961). A similar concern about the incidence of error characterizes the
Court's decisions limiting the use of summary procedures in the regulation of obscenity.
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); see Note, Prior Adversary
Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, 70 CoLur.
L. Rav. 1403, 1415 (1970); Note,
Postal Sanctions: A Study of the Summary Use of Administrative Power, 31 Im. LJ. 257
(1956).
111 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
112 Id. at 552.
113 The Court sought to buttress its holding by reference to the social goals that
animate the public assistance system. 397 U.S. at 265. Achievement of those goals-providing opportunities to the poor, avoiding the consequences of widespread frustration and
insecurity-depends not only on termination procedures but also on the procedures by
which initial eligibility is established. The Court, however, did not consider the possibility raised by Justice Black that if pretermination hearings are required, "the government will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility," thereby "insur[ing] that many will never get on
the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings
followed to determine eligibility." Id. at 279 (dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart also dissented. See Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in TE RIGHTrs OF AMmEaCANS 66,
74 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971).
13A 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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the Court held Wisconsin's summary garnishment procedure unconstitutional because it did not provide a hearing prior to the in rem
seizure of an individual's wages. Wages, the Court said, are "a specialized type of property,"1 15 distinctive in the hardship that their deprivation can cause. Thus, the Court implicitly recognized that prejudgment
garnishment inflicts social costs similar to those that, in Goldberg v.
Kelly, it found imposed by termination of welfare benefits.
The factors that the Court weighed in Sniadach and in Goldberg are
similar in other respects. The likelihood that a creditor had garnished
the wages erroneously or fraudulently and could not sustain his position
at a judicial hearing was high.11 6 Moreover, once a person's wages are
garnished, he is typically disabled from persevering to an eventual
hearing on the merits. 117 These two characteristics, like their analogues
in Goldberg, suggest that a subsequent judicial hearing is not an effective protection for the wage earner against a garnishment that he could
defeat on the merits-if he were able to persevere until a hearing.
In Goldberg the Court did not doubt that the state's asserted fiscal
interest was a legitimate one, but found that it was not of sufficient
weight to justify the injury inflicted by summary termination of welfare benefits. In Sniadach the Court found no state interest that rose
to the level of the "extraordinary situations"'1 8 that it said had existed
in earlier decisions sustaining the constitutionality of summary action:
the state had merely made available to creditors a procedural device
giving their private interest an advantage over that of their alleged
debtors." 9 It would be hazardous to assert that state protection of a
private interest is never entitled to the same degree of constitutional
respect as state protection of a government interest-there is an obvious state interest in protecting important private interests. In Sniadach,
115 Id. at 340; see James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1972); cf. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6331(d).
116 See 395 U.S. at 341, quoting from 114 CONG. REc. 1832 (1968) (remarks of Representative Sullivan): "What we know from our study of this problem is that in a vast number
of cases the debt is a fraudulent one, saddled on a poor ignorant person who is trapped
in an easy credit nightmare, in which he is charged double for something he could not
pay for even if the proper price was called for, and then hounded into giving up his
pound of flesh, and being fired besides."
117 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972); 395 U.S. at 341, quoting from Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-an Empirical Study, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 753
(1968).
118 395 U.S. at 339; see id. at 343 n.* (Harlan, J., concurring).
119 Although the impact of a jeopardy assessment may be as severe as the impact of a
garnishment, it is doubtful whether Sniadach undermines the constitutionality of the
jeopardy assessment, which rests on the more substantial state interest it serves. Kennedy,
Due Process Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 19 Am. U.L. Ray. 158, 165-66 (1970).
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however, the state made no attempt to justify the importance of the
particular private interest protected by the summary garnishment
120
procedure at issue.
The concerns that motivated the Court in Goldberg and Sniadach
21
appear again in two later decisions. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau'
the Court held unconstitutional a state statute authorizing certain
persons to post a public notice in retail liquor outlets prohibiting the
sale or gift of liquor to named individuals with excessive drinking
habits. Despite the "degrading" impact that posting might have on
an individual, 122 there was no provision in the law for notice or prior
hearing. The statute gave the power of posting to a wide array of persons, including "the wife of such person" and a number of minor local
officials. 123 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court was concerned
that a posted individual "may have been the victim of an official's
caprice,"' 124 especially since injury to reputation by error, as the melancholy history of defamation litigation suggests, is never wholly reversible.
In Bell v. Burson125 the Court again applied the principles of Goldberg and Sniadach, holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring
summary suspension of the driver's license of any uninsured motorist
who was unable after an accident to post security for the amount of
damages claimed against him. The Court found that the statute's
failure to provide for a prior determination "whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against [the motorist]
as a result of the accident"'126 was a denial of due process. The
120 Lower court interpretations of Goldberg and Sniadach have varied widely as a
result. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972); Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty
and a "Specialized Type of Property . . . in Our Economic System", 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502

(1971).
121 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
122 Cf. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1961); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 841 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

400 U.S. at 434-35 n.2.
Id. at 437. A statute that lodges the authority to initiate summary action in relatively minor officials, as in Constantineau,or in private citizens, as in both Constantineau
and Sniadach, greatly increases the likelihood of its ill-considered use. An administrative
agency exercising summary authority is more likely to be cognizant of the legal implications of acting summarily, is more likely to have an informed basis for action, and is
more likely to be compelled by its limited resources to restrict its use of summary action
to the most egregious instances. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972) ("No state
official participates in the decision to seek a writ [of replevin]
-.
; Wellford v.
Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971).
125 402 US. 535 (1971).
126 Id. at 542.
123

124
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Court assigned great weight, as it had in Goldberg, Sniadach, and
Constantineau, to the impact of summary action on the individual.
Bell, a clergyman whose ministry required him to travel by car to cover
three rural Georgia communities, was "severely handicapped in the
27
performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses."'
Moreover, the likelihood of error meant, as it had in the earlier cases,
128
that the impact would be entirely unjustified in some instances.
The ultimate question in Burson was the nature of the governmental
interest justifying the use of summary authority in the suspension of
drivers' licenses. The Court found that "the only purpose" of summary
suspension was to help private individuals to secure any judgment they
might recover from the uninsured motorist. It may well be that such
a use of summary authority serves a legitimate governmental purpose,
especially since accident victims who do not receive compensation from
those who have caused their injuries may require public assistance. But
the legitimacy of the government's interest does not necessarily justify
protecting it by summary action. If there was, in Burson, an emergency
necessitating summary action, the state made no attempt to demonstrate it.
The decisions in these four cases-Goldberg v. Kelly, Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., Wisconsin v. Constantineau,and Bell v. Burson
-indicate that the Supreme Court is prepared, after weighing certain
factors, to override a legislative determination that summary action is
necessary or permissible. The factors to be considered include the
severity of the impact of summary action on the individual's means for
survival, his livelihood, and his reputation; the likelihood that the
summary action will be taken erroneously; the degree to which it will
disable the individual from participating in a subsequent hearing; and
the adequacy of the subsequent hearing to protect his interests.
It may be suggested that these decisions are primarily a special response to poverty, and do not illuminate generally the constitutional
law of summary action. There is no question that in Goldberg, Sniadach, and perhaps Bell, poverty served to intensify the impact of summary action on the individual. In each case, however, the state had the
opportunity to demonstrate a countervailing governmental interest adequate to justify that impact. Indeed, the significance of these decisions
lies in the states' inability to persuade the Court that such an interest
existed.
Id. at 537.
The state made no inquiry into whether the licensee was at fault, even though
liability could be imposed only for fault.
127

128
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Conclusion

Although summary action remains a striking exception to the due
process requirement of a prior hearing, the Supreme Court has indicated that the state is justified in acting summarily, and hence does so
without denying due process, when the state's interest in acting
promptly to protect the public against a serious threat to its safety,
health, or economic well-being outweighs the individual's interest in
having an opportunity to be heard before the state acts, perhaps in
error, in ways that may cause him significant injury. The Court has
sustained the traditional uses of summary action in areas of longstanding governmental primacy-the waging of war, tax collection,
the regulation of banking, and protection of the public health-because of the authenticity and urgency of the state's interest in meeting
an emergency. Yet few of these decisions attempt to define an emergency by careful analysis of the facts that were before the legislature or
the administrative agency.
More difficult cases-in which the gravity of the state's interest was
less convincing and the impact of summary action on the individual
more obvious-have made greater intellectual demands on the Court
and caused it to refine its approach to the balancing process. These
cases have arisen in contexts, such as the termination of welfare payments, quite removed from traditional areas of summary governmental
action. The Court in these cases has examined factual situations skeptically and intensively, inquiring into both the precise nature of the
state's asserted interest in acting summarily and the impact of summary
process on the individual. As the state's interest in summary action has
become more attenuated and the severity of its impact correspondingly
less justifiable, the Court has declined to defer to particular legislative
judgments. Rather, it has enforced stricter constitutional requirements
as to what properly constitutes an "emergency" or "extraordinary"
situation warranting the use of summary procedures.
II.

SUMMARY

ACTION AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS:

PERFORMANCE AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The Supreme Court's decisions illuminating the theory of summary
action and the constitutional principles to which it is subject are
clearly important. But the process of government by which summary
action is authorized and invoked depends on more than the decisions
of the Supreme Court. It is the responsibility of the legislature in the
first instance to determine whether to authorize an administrative
agency to act summarily. The courts' insistence on statutory authoriza-
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tion'129 seeks to insure that the legislature will authorize divergence
from the constitutional norm of a prior hearing only after it has considered the implications of doing so.
The question whether Congress should authorize an administrative
agency to act summarily-on what terms and under what restrictions
-is thus a prudential one. A prior administrative hearing has become
the constitutional norm because of the fundamental values that deliberative hearings are believed to serve: reducing the possibility of error
and protecting the individual against precipitate use of governmental
authority.130 When Congress grants an administrative agency the power
to act summarily, it subordinates these values to others deemed more
important.
What considerations should Congress take into account when it
makes so significant a judgment? The inquiry is perhaps best approached by exploring how summary action works in practice, how
administrative procedures might be structured to insure careful exercise of summary authority, and what role judicial review can play in
tempering the impact of summary action.
A.

How Summary Action Works in Practice

1. The Risk of Error.Summary authority is designed to be exercised
in emergency situations. To be effective, it must often be exercised
quickly, under the pressures of the moment. When an administrative
agency acts in such exigent circumstances, it is likely to be acting upon
incomplete information. Even when an agency has several weeks, or
even months, to decide whether to act, as agencies empowered to
suspend proposed ates usually do, the decision to take summary action
is not always based upon adequate information. 13'
When an administrative agency acts on incomplete information,
untested by the adversary process and untempered by an opportunity
for deliberation, it is far more likely to err. The bounds of the resulting
error may be extended by an agency's tendency-perhaps a proper one
in the premises of an emergency-to insure that the public interest is
adequately protected by entering summary orders that prove, in retrospect, unnecessarily broad. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue's
tendency to overassess in making jeopardy assessments13 2 and the Food
129 See text and notes at notes 23-26 supra.
130 See text and notes at notes 30-32 supra.
131 Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see, e.g., Spritzer, Uses of the
Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examination of Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 39, 56 (1971) (Suspension Board of the ICC).
132 See text and notes at notes 58-59 supra.
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and Drug Administration's practice of condemning entire shipments
of goods on the basis of representative samples' 33 are familiar examples. 13 4 More complete information and an opportunity for greater
deliberation would undoubtedly result in more precisely calibrated
orders.
In addition, the risk of arbitrary action is almost surely increased
when an administrative agency is permitted to act without the moderating constraint that the prospect of a prior hearing typically imposes
on administrative initiatives. 13 5 The existence of this risk was the subject of Judge Pell's vigorous dissent in Nor-Am Agricultural Products,
Inc. v. Hardin13 6 A national news program had reported that three
young children were "rendered virtually vegetables"' 137 as the result of
mercury poisoning allegedly caused by a fungicide. The next morning,
the Secretary of Agriculture summarily suspended the registration of
the fungicide as an "economic poison"'3 8 pending a hearing on its permanent cancellation. The district court enjoined the suspension preliminarily but the court of appeals ultimately reversed en banc, holding
that the Secretary's action was not subject to judicial review.
Judge Pell's dissent argued that the Secretary's decision to take summary action, reached on the basis of no more than undocumented and
uninvestigated allegations, 13 9 exemplified the danger that emotional
charges would increase the likelihood of administrative arbitrariness
and error:
When a product has been used on the market for more than twenty
years and is essential for agriculture and when there has been no
other recorded incident that the use of the product has been detrimental to the public health, I can reach no conclusion other than
333 See United States v. 432 Gross Rubber Prophylactics, 65 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn.
1946), aff'd sub nom., Gellman v. United States, 159 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1947); A.O. Anderson
& Co. v. United States, 284 F. 542 (9th Cir. 1922).
134 Administrative regulations

that attempt to ensure

adequate protection for the

public interest may also result in unnecessarily broad summary orders. See, e.g., SEC Rule
252(e)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(e)(2) (1971), requiring suspension of a broker-dealer's exemption from full registration with respect to all current offerings whenever it is suspended
with respect to a single offering.
135 See Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility Rate Proceedings, 51 IowA L. REv. 267, 274 (1966).
136 435 F.2d 1151, 1161, rev'g on rehearing en banc 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970),
petition for cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
137 Id. at 1162. See generally B. RoutcHE, THE ORANGE MAN 116-37 (1971).

138 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 4(c), 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c)
(1970).
139 See 435 F.2d at 1164; 46 IND. L.J. 238, 240 (1971).
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that the suspension was, in a technical and legal sense, an arbitrary
and capricious one. 140
The most deliberative administrative action may, of course, prove
erroneous or arbitrary. The relevant question is the extent to which
summary action results in a higher incidence of error than that resulting from formal adjudication. The few studies of summary termination of welfare payments undertaken prior to Goldberg v. Kelly found
a disturbingly high incidence.' 41 In the absence of judicial review of
summary action, however, empirical studies are possible only when a
formal adjudicatory hearing is held after summary action has been
taken, and such subsequent hearings are relatively infrequent. 42 For
example, more than 80 percent of the proposed tariffs summarily
suspended by the Interstate Commerce Commission and more than 90
percent of those suspended by the Civil Aeronautics Board are either
voluntarily withdrawn by the filing carrier or cancelled because of the
carrier's failure to defend at a hearing.143 The percentage of summary
seizures made by the Food and Drug Administration that are never
1
contested at a subsequent hearing is almost certainly as high. '
Although it is difficult to measure the incidence of error accompanying summary action, the hypothesis that summary action results
in a higher incidence of error than formal adjudicatory hearings
remains convincing. The infrequency with which those affected by
summary action contest its merits at a subsequent hearing does not
obviously make the hypothesis less plausible. It does not necessarily
indicate that those affected by summary action are prepared to concede
the correctness of the agency's judgment; rather, it more likely suggests
that the costs of contesting, in terms of resources, adverse publicity, and
agency disfavor, are often prohibitive. 45 In deciding whether to grant
140 Id. at 1161-62; see Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d 293, 308-09 (7th Cir.
1972).
141 See text and notes at notes 102-103 supra.

142 For an example where routine judicial involvement did make empirical study possible, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, supra note 46, at 529: "In a surprisingly large percentage
of these cases [in which courts issued preliminary injunctions pending an administrative
hearing], the NLRB found upon further investigation and hearing, that the complaint

against the union was not sustainable; the conduct that had been enjoined was determined
to be permissible after all."
143 Spritzer, supra note 131, at 53, 57 & 76.
144 Telephone interview with William Conway, Assistant to the Regional Director, Food
and Drug Administration, in Philadelphia, Apr., 1971.
145 Cf. 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TAmnsE, supra note 37, § 4.06 (1958). But Cf. R. CRAMTON,
THE CONDUCT OF RATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIssION 47 (Prelim.
Draft, Dec. 1, 1961) (Report for the Administrative Conference of the United States).
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summary authority to a particular agency, Congress should therefore
determine in each case whether the higher incidence of uncorrected
error likely to result is acceptable in light of that agency's responsibilities.
2. The Role of the Staff. Commentators have long been concerned
with the significant role that an agency's staff' 46 plays in the determination of administrative proceedings. 147 The staff's role is accentuated
when informal administrative decisions, such as the determination to
invoke summary authority, are made. The staff's power to decide which
matters to put to the members of the agency is itself of considerable
significance. And once the staff elects to put a particular matter, the
pressures of time and events that almost always surround a decision
whether to act summarily make independent consideration by the
agency's members difficult. They must inevitably rely heavily on the
staff-to investigate the facts, to create a record, to assess the seriousness of the threat to the public, to analyze the likely consequences of
acting or declining to act summarily, to give legal advice, and to
recommend what action should be taken. 148 These circumstances give

the staff's recommendation an especial momentum for acceptance. 49
The Hoover Commission noted the possibility that the staff may
"extend or curtail the policies" of an agency in informal matters; it
pointed to claims that the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in enforcing the agency's registration requirements, "has insisted
on more onerous requirements for disclosure than the Commission
would demand."' 150 Others have argued that years of enforcement effort
unconsciously bias the staff, and that the staff is often permitted to
enforce its bias without adequate supervision or correction by the
members of the agency.' 51
146 See, e.g., A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 153-56 (1967); Johnson, Book Review, 23
STAN. L. REV. 173, 184 (1970) ("It is axiomatic that an administrative agency's staff has

substantial power in channeling and influencing the agency's actions.").
147 See, e.g., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 37, § 11; Beelar, The Dark
Phase of Agency Litigation, 12 AD. L. BULL. 34 (1959); Westwood, The Davis Treatise:
Meaning to the Practitioner,43 MINN. L. REV. 607, 614-17 (1967).
148 Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 894 (1967); Hector, Problems
of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 937 (1960).
149 At the Interstate Commerce Commission, the reality of the staff's preponderant role

in the determination of whether to act summarily has been formalized: the Commissioners
have delegated to a board of five employees the authority to decide initially whether to

suspend proposed tariffs, subject to review by a division of the Commission. 26 Fed. Reg.
5167 (1961).
150 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 146 (1949) (Appendix N).

151 See Freeman, supra note 148, at 894; Lev, supra note 92, at 539.
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It would be surprising if an agency's staff, as a result of its investigation in a particular case, did not become convinced of the desirability
of taking decisive administrative action. Indeed, because of its professional dedication and its regular exposure to an industry's marginal
conduct, the staff may well become increasingly less sensitive to the
individual problems of those whom the agency regulates and develop
a propensity for strong regulation. It may believe that its proper role
is to recommend that the agency act in borderline cases in order to
encourage a toughened regulatory stance and to expose the members
of the agency to the difficulties of controlling conduct at the extremity
of its regulatory authority. The consequence may be that the members
of the agency will approve staff recommendations that the staff thought
would be rejected.
Care must be exercised, however, in drawing conclusions from these
observations. Agency members are likely to be more sensitive than the
staff to the unfavorable repercussions that can result from the injudicious use of summary power. Moreover, they are usually aware of the
staff's desire to exert influence and its possible bias in pressing its
recommendations. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, has established "administrative safeguards against over-zealousness by individual staff members."' 152 The Commission requires the
staff to submit a memorandum as detailed as possible whenever it
recommends that summary action be taken; if time does not permit, the
agency members may be apprised of the basis for the staff's recommendation by an oral presentation, but the staff must submit a memorandum supporting its recommendation as soon as possible thereafter.
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service has designed an elaborate
system of internal administrative review, including a progression of
audits at the regional and national levels, to guard against unreasonable
staff recommendations to make use of jeopardy assessments.153
Still, the question remains whether the staff is likely to have greater
influence on decisions to exercise summary authority than it has on
agency decisions made in the fullness of time. A categorical answer
cannot be given because administrative agencies respond with varying
degrees of urgency and success to the recurrently expressed concern
152 Address by Ralph H. Demmler, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the ABA,
Aug. 17, 1954, in 10 Bus. LAw. 42, 46 (1954).
153 See Letter from William H. Smith, Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service,
to Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., March 21, 1968, in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 73-75 (1968).
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that staff influence is too great. The concern, however, remains-it
reflects tendencies that have been commented on for a generation and
it corresponds with widely held views of how bureaucracies tend to
make decisions under the pressure of time.'5 4
3. The Possibility of Prejudgment. Whenever the members of an
agency participate in a decision to institute administrative proceedings,
they run the risk-contemplated by the permissive provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act on commingling of functions' 5 5 -of
becoming committed to a position on the merits. 15 6 Philip Elman,
reflecting on his service as a Federal Trade Commissioner, has said
that "when Commission members, prior to issuing a complaint review
investigative files for evidence of violations of the law, the burden of
persuasion is subtly shifted to the respondent once the complaint does
issue."157

In order to minimize the risk that members of an agency will become
biased by participation in the decision to institute proceedings, many
commentators have suggested that greater authority to act be delegated
to the agency staff.' 58 Other commentators have been less alarmed by
the risk; they have argued that the determination to issue a complaint
"calls for mental activity like that involved in a judge's action on a
demurrer or on an application for a temporary restraining order, and
wholly unlike that involved in a prosecutor's efforts to compile an
impressive record of convictions."' 59 This argument may be valid with
respect to the "mental activity" demanded in deciding to issue a
complaint, but it does not deal adequately with the peculiar impetus to
partiality that a decision to authorize summary action may create.
The decision to act summarily differs from other decisions to institute
administrative proceedings. Because it typically has immediate and
severe consequences for the respondent, the decision is quite properly
154 See generally M. DIMOCK, G. DiMocK & L. KoENIG,
(rev. ed. 1958); F. MARX, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: AN

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION

150-69

TO BUREAUCRACY

(1957).
155 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1970); see Freedman, supra note 49, at 35-67.
156 "[Fjor commissioners, as for judges," Judge Friendly has written, "freedom of deci-

sion is at least subconsciously constricted once a position has been publicly taken." Davis
& Randall, Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 673, 679 (V.D.N.Y. 1963) (footnote omitted).
157 Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.J. 777,
810 (1971). But see Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES
305, 333-36 (1972).
158 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENFRAL's COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE, supra note 1, at 22-23, 56-57; REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 62-63, 82-84 (1969); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organizationand Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 418-24 (1964).
159 W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, supra note 46, at 878-79.
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exposed to closer public examination and the pressure on the agency to
demonstrate the necessity and propriety of its action is increased. A
decision in favor of the respondent at the ultimate hearing on the merits
may be construed as an admission that the original action was arbitrary.
The agency may therefore approach the hearing with a greater institutional self-interest in justifying its initial decision than it does in
proceedings instituted by a complaint.
Even when self-interest of this kind does not affect the ultimate
decision, the appearance of prejudgment is likely to remain. 16 0 This
situation may have serious consequences: it may place a cloud over the
perceived fairness of the subsequent proceeding and may induce some
respondents to forego their statutory right to a hearing. Both Congress
and the agencies should therefore give careful thought to the development of means by which to avoid the possibility, as well as the appearance, that the decision to act summarily will influence the ultimate
decision on the merits of the case, although the task is concededly
difficult of achievement.
4. The Capacity to Injure Wrongfully. Summary action has a particular capacity to injure those against whom it is wrongfully invoked.
In addition to its immediate effects, which may themselves be harsh,
summary action often generates publicity that causes damage more
enduring and extensive than do the terms of the summary order itself.
When Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Flemming, two
weeks before Thanksgiving in 1959, warned the public that a dangerous
residue of pesticide chemicals remained on many cranberries in that
year's crop, and the Food and Drug Administration summarily seized
several shipments, substantially all of the crop remained unsold,
although more than 99 percent of all the cranberries produced that
year were subsequently found fit for consumption. 161 Similarly, when
the Securities and Exchange Commission summarily suspends trading
in a security, the resulting publicity can destroy the marketability of
the stock. 1 2
160 See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959). In suspending a broker-dealer's registration pending a hearing on the merits of
revoking it entirely, the SEC usually makes an express disclaimer of having predetermined
the issue on the merits. See, e.g., Peerless-New York, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 712, 716 (1960).
161 Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette, Lecture at the Harvard Law School, March 22, 1960,
quoted in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 672 (4th ed.

1960).
162 See Note, Publicity and the Security Market: A Case Study, 7 U. Cmr. L. REv. 676
(1940). The capacity to generate publicity damaging to an individual is one that summary

action shares, of course, with other forms of prehearing administrative action, particularly
the issuance of press releases announcing the initiation of agency proceedings against an
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The capacity wrongfully to impose serious injury significantly distinguishes summary action from administrative action taken after a
formal adjudicatory hearing. The damaging impact of summary action
is a cause for particular concern because, in the absence of an administrative hearing, the risk of error is probably greater; the unfavorable
publicity rests wholly on the agency's ex parte assertion; the order may
be broader than necessary; and judicial review is typically unavailable.
Moreover, the injury inflicted by summary action is sometimes so
individual. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade
Commission: PretrialPractices, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 131-42 (1968); Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CHI. L. Rav. 225, 231-38 (1957); Note, Disparaging
Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 CoLUM. L. Ray. 1512 (1967).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for example, has the capacity to inflict
substantial damage upon an organization by use of a press release pending an administrative determination, as the Sierra Club found out in 1966. The Commissioner
announced that the Service was instituting a proceeding to determine whether the
club should be disqualified from receiving charitable contributions, deductible to the
donor, because it had engaged in activities designed to influence legislation. Charitable contributions made to the Sierra Club after the date of the Commissioner's announcement would not be deductible if the Service ultimately concluded that the club was not
a charitable organization for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. That the Commissioner's press release severely hurt the Sierra Club cannot be doubted. "By issuing the
press release, the IRS prevented the Sierra Club from wooing contributors with guaranteed
deductibility during the investigation." Note, Problems and Procedures in Revoking the
Eligibility of Charitable Organizations to Receive Deductible Contributions Because of
Lobbying Activities-The Sierra Club Controversy, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 619 (1967). See
also W, GELLHoRN & C. BYsa, supra note 46, at 522-23.
Because of the peculiar sensitivity of the securities market, the capacity of the Securities
and Exchange Commission to cause substantial injury by announcing that a public proceeding will be commenced is perhaps as great as that of any federal agency. Kukatush
Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Silver King Mines, Inc. v. Cohen, 261
F. Supp. 666 (D. Utah 1966); Note, Publicity and the Security Market: A Case Study, 7 U.
Cux. L. REv. 676 (1940). The Commission is authorized to issue a stop order suspending
the effectiveness of a registration statement only after notice and hearing. Securities Act of
1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970). But the very announcement that such a hearing
will be held, usually given wide-spread publicity, can have, as one court has said, "grave
consequences." Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see Jones v. SEC,
298 U.S. 1, 13 (1936); L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMIsrRATIvE LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS
20-21 (3d ed. 1968); J. LANms, supra note 13. Similarly, serious injury typically follows the
public announcement that the Commission has given a broker-dealer notice of a hearing
to suspend his registration pending a final determination at a hearing on revocation. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1970). "The moment you bring
a public proceeding against a broker-dealer who depends upon public confidence in his
reputation," an experienced lawyer in this area has written, "he is to all intents and purposes out of business. His. business is destroyed before he Lsas a chance to defend himself
and before the Commision has had a chance to hear his side of the case and to decide
whether he is guilty of the matters charged, or whether, in fact, he is innocent." Freeman,
supra note 148, at 897. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 368 (1963)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Mason, Administrative Law-Reality or Red Tape?, 40 Rxv. Jm U.P.R.
91, 100 n.20 (1971).
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great that, in effect, the availability of a subsequent hearing is meaningless. In Aquavella v. Richardson,6 3 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's summary suspension of medicare payments to a
nursing home, which depended on them almost entirely for its revenue,
"quickly forced [it] out of business."'01 4 For the businessman whose
market has been wrongfully destroyed by a summary order, for the
college student wrongfully expelled on the eve of graduation, the
prospect of achieving ultimate vindication on the merits has only
poetic appeal: the damage and disruption already imposed is irremediable.
In other instances, including many in which a favorable decision at
a subsequent hearing would be meaningful, summary action has such
a devastating impact that the affected party is disabled from effectively
contesting the merits. Thus, as the Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelly,
the termination of welfare benefits "adversely affects [a recipient's]
ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy."' 0 5 As a consequence, the injury caused by wrongful invocation of summary authority
may never be cured.
5. Increased Reliance on Informal Processes. The capacity of summary action to render a subsequent hearing meaningless or to disable
an individual from participating in it effectively has important implications for an agency's relationship with those whom it regulates.
Whenever the impact of summary action is likely to be severe, the
power to threaten its invocation may be as significant as actually
invoking it. The power of the Food and Drug Administration, for example, to threaten the seizure of goods is so great that the owner may
acquiesce in the agency's objections even though he believes them
unfounded. 0 Exercise of a rate-regulating agency's power summarily
to suspend proposed rates can have such costly consequences that a
carrier may be prepared to consent to a specific rate structure whose
approval has been foreshadowed by the agency simply because it
07
cannot absorb the financial loss that suspension would impose.
16A3437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971).
164 Id. at 404.
165 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); see Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393

U.S. 233 (1968).
166 See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.L. REv. 1005, 1112-13
(1967). See also Comment, Governmental Enforcement Powers in the Regulation of the
Drug Industry, 24 Sw. L.J. 500 (1970).
107 R. CAvEs, Ant TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 862 (1962); see Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d

891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ('the pressures on the carriers to file rates conforming exactly with
the [CAB's] formula were great, if not actually irresistible," id. at 897, because they were

faced with "immediate revenue needs ...

in times of rapidly rising costs," id. at 900).
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The power of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to appoint a conservator is so momentous that few banks can resist the agency's recommendation that they sign proposed consent decrees agreeing to changes
in challenged practices, even though the bank may be convinced that
16 8
the practices are legal.

The extent to which the mere availability of summary authority
is sufficient to coerce compliance with an agency's demands, typically by
means of an informal settlement, cannot readily be measured. But the
existence of the phenomenon-what Commissioner Goddard of the
Food and Drug Administration called "the somber gun of enforcement"169-- can hardly be doubted. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that
administrative agencies need credible reserves of power precisely because of their usefulness in encouraging informal settlements, without
which effective regulation would be considerably more difficult to
achieve. 170
The power to act summarily is doubtless a forceful bargaining
weapon in strengthening an agency's capacity to secure settlements: it
lessens an individual's incentive to assert unrealistic positions and to
employ delaying tactics.17 1 But when the powers possessed by the
administrator are great, he may be inclined to take advantage of their
coercive potential by demanding changes in behavior that, however
much they conform to an enlightened conception of equity or justice,
are beyond his statutory authority to exact. An administrator who can
back his demands with the threat of summary action may also be
tempted to seek concessions to which he would not be entitled on the
evidence, were it fully developed at an adjudicatory hearing. Some commentators have charged, for example, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission sometimes succumbs to these temptations in exercising its
discretionary power to accelerate the effective date of a registration
17 3
As
statement1 72 (which is requested by virtually every registrant).
168 See K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAv, CASES-TExT-RoBLE.Ms 76 (1965). In addition,
an individual who is subject to an agency's continuing supervision may sometimes accede
to an agency demand in the belief that too-frequent resistance may, in the long run,
jeopardize his relationship with the agency. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in
Welfare Administration,54 CALIF. L. RFV. 479, 494 (1966); Freedman, supra note 49, at 34.
169 1967 HEW ANN. REP. 198.
170 See Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 187 (1961).
171 Cf. Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate Reorganizations, 4 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 218, 239 (1937). See generally Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. Rrv. 612 (1971).
172

17 C.F.R. § 230A60 (1971). See generally 4 L. Loss,

SECURIES REGULATION

2338-40

(2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
173 See Wyoming-Gulf Sulphur Corp., 37 S.E.C. 867 (1956); Mulford, "Acceleration"
Under the Securities Act of 1933-A Reply to the Securities and Exchange Commision,
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Professor Davis has noted, "Business reasons usually make acceleration
• . .so compelling that the registrant is willing to yield to onerous
conditions,"' 174 particularly with respect to the extent of disclosure of
information, even though he is convinced that a court would find
that the Commission had exceeded its proper authority. Similarly,
prior to Goldberg v. Kelly it was said that because of the power to
terminate public assistance without a hearing, caseworkers were able
to enforce standards of personal behavior that were not required
75
by law.'
Whatever the validity of these particular objections, the inclination
of an agency to seek informal settlements as a substitute for the use of
summary authority is probably explained more by a reluctance to invoke
such awesome powers than by a temptation to coerce illegitimate results.
Indeed, this reluctance to risk imposing the severe injuries of which
summary action is capable often leads an agency to devise mechanisms
that eventually supplant summary action as the usual method for
achieving the agency's legislative mandate. Examples of these mechanisms include the Food and Drug Administration's elaborate recall procedures, described in the regulations as "an alternative to multiple
seizures"'17 6 and regarded, in the words of Commissioner Goddard, as
"less punitive"1 77 than summary action; the Federal Communications
Commission's technique of "constant surveillance" in regulating the
rates of common carriers; 178 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's reliance on consent orders to end questionable banking practices; 179 and
the "speaking" rate suspension order of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
condemned in Moss v. CAB 8 0 as subversive of the statutory scheme.
14 Bus. LAw. 156 (1958); Mulford, "Acceleration" Under the Securities Act of 1933-A
Postscript, 22 Bus. LAw. 1087 (1967).
174 K. DAvis, supra note 168, at 73-74; cf,e.g., Wall Street Journal, Mar. 14, 1972, at
12, col. 3 (signatories to an SEC consent order said they "consented to sanctions because
the proceedings would have required an enormous expenditure of time, effort and
money .
").
175 See Handler, supra note 168, at 494-95; Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's
Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 361, 867-71 (1965).
176 21 C.F.R. § 3.85 (1972); see text at notes 189-91 infra.
177 1967 HEW ANN. RP. 197.
178 See Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 816 (1966); Spritzer, supra note 131, at 62-75; Welch, Constant Surveillance: A Modern
Regulatory Tool, 8 VILL. L. Rxv. 340 (1963).
179 Memorandum from Mary Jane Checchi, Staff Attorney, Administrative Conference
of the United States, to James 0. Freedman, Aug. 24, 1971, at 2 (copy on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review); Letter from Tynan Smith, Secretary of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Richard K. Berg, Executive Secretary,
Administrative Conference of the United States, Oct. 17, 1972 (on file at The University
of Chicago Law Review).
180 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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The consequence of administrative innovations such as these is that
governmental challenges to private conduct are more often resolved
informally than by the hearing processes that Congress provided as
part of the legislative scheme authorizing summary action. This has
serious implications for administrative regulation. When an agency
prefers informal negotiations to the more formal process that moves
from summary action to the conclusion of a subsequent evidentiary
hearing, its actions are shielded from judicial review and public
scrutiny alike. The technique of "constant surveillance," for example,
may effectively exclude interested persons from participation in the
regulatory process although they would have a right to be heard at
formal proceedings.
If granting summary authority to an agency can thus lead to increased reliance on informal processes, then a responsible legislative
decision to grant that authority cannot be made without considering
whether this is a desirable result. Congress undoubtedly understood
that administrative agencies would rely in some measure on informal
processes, but it did provide for formal, more public procedures in
areas made subject to summary action. The question in each instance,
therefore, must be whether an agency has struck a proper balance between the use of summary action and the negotiation of informal settlements.
6. The Extent to Which Summary Action Is Used. The reasonableness of the use of summary power can be measured, in a rough way at
least, by the frequency with which federal administrative agencies
invoke their summary authority to perform a variety of regulatory tasks.
a. Of the six agencies for which data are available, the Internal
Revenue Service has made the least use of its summary authority.
During 1966 and 1967, the last two years for which statistics have been
published, the Commissioner ordered, respectively, ninety-two and
seventy-five jeopardy assessments for suspected income, estate, and gift
tax deficiencies. 81 Since more than 100 million tax returns were filed
in each of the two years, 8 2 and many of the jeopardy assessments
ordered during those years related to returns filed in previous years, the
Commissioner's use of jeopardy assessments in the administration of
the tax laws has been strikingly limited.
b. The Securities and Exchange Commission has summary authority
181 Letter from William H. Smith, Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, to
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Mar. 21, 1968, in Hearings,supra note 153, at 76. But see Gould,
supra note 57 (indicating that 2,500 jeopardy assessments were ordered in fiscal 1958).
182 1966 IRS ANN. REP. 14; 1967 IRS ANN. REP. 16.
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to suspend trading in a registered security for a period not exceeding
ten days when the public interest so requires.1's In the course of regulating trading in the tens of thousands of securities registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has increasingly (although
still sparingly) used that authority. In 1970, it suspended trading only
fifty-five times; in the several years prior to 1970, it did so even less
184
frequently.
The Commission has also made only limited use of its summary
authority to suspend the exemption from registration granted issuers
of certain small offerings when it believes the issuer is not entitled to
the exemption or has violated one of its conditions. 8 5 During the last
three fiscal years for which information is available, the Commission
suspended less than two percent of the outstanding exemptions, an
8 6
average of twenty-two per year.
c. During fiscal 1970, the Food and Drug Administration instituted
600 seizure proceedings involving adulterated or mislabeled foods,
drugs, and cosmetics on the basis of information gained by conducting
27,275 inspections (of factories, warehouses, and public eating places)
and collecting 61,298 product samples for testing. 8 7 As it has for
every year since fiscal 1968, the Food and Drug Administration thus
resorted to summary action in less than one percent of the cases in
which inspection or sampling had provided a basis for determining
whether the law had been violated.
Although the number of seizures made by the FDA in each year
since 1968 has been less than 750 (the average has been 600), more
than 1,000 seizures were instituted in six of the seven years prior to
1968, with a high of 1,288 in fiscal 1964.188 The reduction in the
number of seizures in recent years may reflect in part a reduction in the
Food and Drug Administration's inspection and sampling activity.8 9
A more accurate explanation, however, can probably be found in the
agency's 1965 decision to substitute voluntary recall procedures for
summary seizure. 190
183 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(c)(5), 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(c)(5), 78s(a)(4)

(1970).
184 1966-70 SEC ANN. REPs.
185 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 3(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), (c) (1970); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.261,
230.840, 230.610, 230.656 (1972).
188 1968-70 SEC ANN. REPS.
187 1970 HEW ANN. REP. 273-74. The figures for the two preceding years are of the
same order.
188 1961-70 HEW ANN. REPs.
189 The number of samples collected has declined every year since it peaked in 1964;
inspections have declined less evenly from their peak in 1963. Id.
190 21 C..R. § 8.85 (1972); see 1965 HEW ANN. Rat'. 336-37. Before that decision, in
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d. The Federal Power Commission has summary authority to suspend proposed tariffs for up to five months pending a hearing and
decision on their reasonableness. 1 1 Figures compiled informally by the
Commission indicate that in fiscal 1970 the Commission suspended
only three of the 2,272 tariffs filed by electric utilities and 26 of the
1,320 tariffs filed by natural gas pipeline companies. 19 2 These figures
must be viewed with caution, however, because the Commission has
apparently limited the use of its suspension power to tariffs proposing
rate increases. If these tariffs are considered separately, the Commission
has invoked its suspension authority in a very high incidence of natural
gas pipeline cases, in some years exceeding seventy percent. 193 Of the
approximately twelve thousand tariff changes proposed by natural gas
producers in 1970, more than 40 percent were suspended, largely
pursuant to the Commission's policy of automatically suspending all
proposed gas rates that exceed tentative ceilings established for each
194
area.
e. The Interstate Commerce Commission, exercising its summary
authority to suspend proposed tariffs for seven months pending a
hearing and decision on their reasonableness, typically suspends in full
or in part approximately one to two percent of the tariffs filed annually.195 In fiscal 1970, for example, the Commission considered for
suspension 11,137--or 3.6 percent-of the 305,517 proposed tariffs
filed. 196 The tariffs considered for suspension represented 4,088 "tariff
adjustments,"' 197 defined as any change in one or more tariffs raising a
discrete issue. 198 The Commission ultimately suspended 1,758, or less
than half of the adjustments considered. 199
f. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is authorized by
section 225 of the Social Security Act to suspend payment of disability
benefits if he believes that a recipient is no longer disabled.200 The
1964, over 92 percent of 1,398 removals from the market were seizures; however, of the
2,027 removals during 1970, less than 80 percent were accomplished by seizure and more
than 70 percent by recall. See 1964 HEW ANN. REP. 291, 325; 1970 HEW ANN. REP. 273-74.
191 Federal Power Act § 205(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1970); Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 15
U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
192 Spritzer, supra note 131, at 107.
193 A comparable organization of data with respect to electric utility tariffs is not available.
194 See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 771 (1968).
195 1961-70 ICC ANN. REPS.
196 See Spritzer, supra note 131, at 106.
197 1970 ICC ANN. RP. 41.
198 See P. WOLL, supra note 51, at 85; Spritzer, supra note 131, at 51.
199 1970 ICC ANN. Ra'. 41.
200 42 U.S.C. § 425 (1970).
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Department does not publish statistics indicating how frequently this
authority has been used, but Justice Brennan, dissenting in Richardson v. Wright,20 1 noted that the Secretary had suspended disability
benefits in 38,000 cases in 1971, but he did not indicate the total
202
number of persons receiving benefits that year..
The statistics for these six agencies suggest, if any generalization is
possible, that summary action has been taken by most agencies against
only a small percentage of those whose activities are subject to their
regulatory authority. The limited use of summary action by the federal
administrative agencies is consistent with its exceptional position in
our constitutional scheme.
The statistics do not, however, indicate whether summary authority
has been used wisely. They do not provide a basis for determining
whether summary authority has been used too much or too little or in
the most appropriate cases. They do not indicate the degree to which
an agency's decisions to take summary action vel non have been influenced or necessitated by the coercive power that the existence of
summary authority can generate; by the availability of alternative,
often informal, regulatory processes; by the size of the agency's budget;
by the competence of its staff; and by the political power of the particular regulated industry.
If agencies compiled more complete statistics, the decision whether
to invoke summary authority might be better understood, permitting
Congress to initiate more detailed inquiries into the use of summary
power and into the desirability of enlarging or restricting its applications. As a first step toward better informed legislative decision making,
Congress should require agencies now invested with summary authority
to publish statistics that indicate more completely the frequency and
circumstances of its use.
Structuring the Use of Summary Authority
Lawyers have long understood as a general proposition what James
Willard Hurst calls the substantive importance of procedure. But the
relevance of procedure to informal administrative action has only
recently begun to receive serious scholarly attention.oa It is necessary
B.

405 U.S. 208, 224 (1972).
The number of workers receiving disability benefits is not available, but, in fiscal
1970, 2.6 million workers and their dependents were recipients. See 1970 HEW ANN. R.,.
280.
203 See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); E. Gns.HORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 100-20 (1972); Gardner, The
Procedures By Which Informal Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155 (1972); Ltckhart,
The Origin and Use of "Guidelines for the Study of Informal Action in Federal Agencies",
201

202
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to move tentatively, therefore, in considering whether procedures commonly used to structure formal administrative processes have appropriate application to the informal process of summary action. The
extent to which a specific procedure can serve to increase the fairness
of an agency's performance in acting summarily depends, of course,
on whether it is adapted to the agency's particular responsibilities and
circumstances. The task of Congress is to determine, after individualized inquiry, the specific procedures appropriate for a particular
agency and whether such procedures should be imposed by legislation.
The most appropriate response for Congress in many regulatory
contexts may be to encourage agencies to devise their own procedures
and to permit them to modify these procedures as experience recommends. Regardless of whether Congress acts, administrative agencies
have a continuing responsibility to consider whether particular procedural devices would achieve greater fairness in the exercise of summary authority.
A number of requirements and procedures-some drawn from
formal administrative processes, some suggested by the general features
of summary action-are worthy of serious examination. They do not,
of course, exhaust the possibilities.
1. Statutory Standards. One way in which Congress could structure
the use of summary authority would be to enact statutory standards for
its exercise. It would be possible to formulate standards in a variety of
terms. They could follow the language of constitutional requirement
appearing in Supreme Court decisions, for example, in order to stress
the exceptional nature of summary action. They could borrow from the
criteria that equity courts enforce in granting and denying preliminary
injunctions. Or they could use new formulations defining the degree
of exigency or emergency required, or the quantum of evidence that
an agency must possess, before summary action can be taken. One such
definition might provide that an agency can take summary action only
if no less drastic means gives promise of being equally effective in
achieving substantially the same result.
In framing statutory standards, the stringency of the requirements
will necessarily vary from one agency to another, depending, for example, on the severity of the impact that the summary actions of each
agency typically have. In addition, different evidentiary standards may
be appropriate when an agency takes summary action on its own
24 AD. L. REv. 167 (1972); Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of The
Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STuDIES 349 (1972).
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initiative than when it does so in response to the request of an interested private citizen. 204
Although Congress has not always undertaken to provide statutory
standards for the exercise of summary authority,2 0 5 it has done so
occasionally with apparent success. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, for example, provides that the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency may suspend the federal registration of an "economic poison" only if it presents "an imminent hazard
to the public." 20 6 Although Congress chose language sufficiently precise
to convey its intention that "this authority.., should only be exercised
under the most extreme conditions and with the utmost care," 207 it also
chose language sufficiently general to allow the Administrator to exercise discretion on issues of substantive significance: for example,
whether a hazard may be considered "imminent" if its impact will not
be felt for many years, and whether the preservation of fish and wildlife
are among the interests of the "public" that the statute is designed
208
to protect.
Because statutory standards for the exercise of summary authority
will typically be framed in general terms, it may be argued that they
will be regarded as no more than hortatory and will have little influence
on the actual behavior of administrators. One cannot be certain that
there is not some truth to this argument. Nonetheless, when Congress
enacts a statute imposing standards, even general ones, on the exercise
of administrative authority, it "expresse[s] a mood," as Justice Frankfurter wrote in a relevant connection. "As legislation that mood must be
respected, even though it can serve only as a standard for judgment and
not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application." 20 9 It
cannot fairly be assumed that conscientious administrators will remain
indifferent to the mood that Congress expresses in limiting their
210
discretion to exercise summary authority.
204 Some agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Environmental
Protection Agency, may take summary action either on their own initiative or that of a
complainant. See generally Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process,
25 IowA L. REv. 485 (1940).

205 Most of the federal statutes authorizing summary rate suspension do not contain

standards to guide agency decisions to suspend. See, e.g., statutes cited note 15 supra.
206 § 4(c), 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).
207 108 CONG. REc. 17,366 (1962) (remarks of Senator Eastland).
208 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
209 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).

210 If there is reason to doubt that agencies will comply with the statutory standards
Congress enacts, procedures to give greater assurance of agency compliance may be adopted;
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2. Rules and Reasons. Two procedures commonly used to structure
formal administrative processes are the promulgation of rules for the
exercise of a particular discretionary power and the provision of a statement explaining the agency's reasons in each instance for its discretionary acts. The existence of a body of standards tends to encourage
greater deliberation, self-consciousness, and consistency in the exercise
of administrative discretion and thereby reduces the likelihood that an
agency will act arbitrarily.2 11 By promulgating rules and providing
statements of reasons, an administrative agency creates a body of
standards against which its performance can be measured by Congress,
the courts, and the public, and thereby tends to make the law more
democratic. 21 2
These arguments have found renewed expression during the last
decade in scholarly criticism2 13 and judicial decisions214 urging administrative agencies to make greater use of rules and reasons. The immediate question, however, is whether the promulgation of rules and
guidelines and the provision of statements of reasons-practices growfor example, requiring that the members of the agency personally approve the decision
to act summarily, as the Securities and Exchange Commissioners presently do, Interview
with Irving M. Pollack, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission, in Washington, D.C., Jan., 1971; requiring an agency to secure the prior certification of the Attorney General that the statutory standards have been met, as the Food
and Drug Administration must do before instituting summary seizures, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act § 307, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (1946), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (1970); see Memorandum from Mary Jane Checchi, Staff Attorney, Administrative Conference of the United
States, to James 0. Freedman, June 29, 1971, at 7 (copy on file at The University of
Chicago Law Review); or providing for judicial review of administrative decisions to
take summary action, see text at notes 257-271 infra. Because the cost of each of these
procedures-in terms of delay, the possibility of prejudgment, the consumption of agency
resources-will vary for each type of summary action, selection must be made on a
function-by-function basis.
211 See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962); Redford, The Protection of the Public Interest with Special Reference to Administrative Regulation, 48 AMr.
POL. Sci. REV. 1103 (1954). But see Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: Some Reflections, 81 L.Q. REv. 357 (1965).
212 Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,
84 HA v. L. REv. 529, 535 (1971); see T. Lowi, THE END or LiBERALisM (1969).
213 See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 203; H. FRIENDLY, supra note 211; ADMINIsTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION No. 25, ARTICULATION OF AGENCY POLICIES
(adopted May 7, 1971); Wright, Book Review, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J.
575 (1972). See also Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HAav. L. REV. 921 (1965).
214 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
For opinions indicating that reversal of administrative decisions might not have been
necessary had published agency rules governed the situation under review, see Aquavella
v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.

1964).
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ing out of formal administrative processes-can be effective in structuring an agency's exercise of its discretion to invoke summary authority.
Section 3(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies
to "publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public(D) ... statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency." 215 Despite this
requirement, the policies that administrative agencies have developed
for exercising their discretion to take summary action have not generally been published as rules or regulations or in any other form. In
many instances, these policies appear only in internal memoranda prepared for the guidance of the agency's staff. The fact that these memoranda are unpublished increases the possibility of unequal treatment;
knowledge of their substance is likely to be limited to "an elite clique
of agency specialists," 216 many of them former members of the agency's
legal staff, 217 who alone can assert them on behalf of their clients. It
also prevents any effective inquiry into whether the agency's enforcement policies are unequally applied in practice, particularly when a
degree of autonomy has been granted to the agency's regional offices.
The explanation most often given by agency officials for not publishing rules for the exercise of summary authority is the difficulty of
framing them. Most decisions to take summary action, it is said, are
based on a highly developed expertise that gives the agency confidence
in the refined quality of what are, essentially, educated guesses and
hunches. To articulate criteria for taking summary action-the type
of harm, the magnitude of the violation, the seriousness of the threat
to the public interest, the substantiality of the agency's evidence, the
availability of alternate relief, and the special characteristics of the
individual involved, including his prior record of violations, his degree
of culpability, and his vulnerability to successful action-would be, in
the view of many administrators, to do no more than announce obvious
generalities 218 that wou'ld neither standardize an agency's decisionmaking processes nor provide the public with reliable information on
how future cases, each of them turning on individual facts, are likely
219
to be decided.
215 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
Lockhart, supra note 203, at 176.
See Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 27 (1971).
218 See Auerbach, Pluralism and the Administrative Process, 400 ANNALS 1, 6 & n20
216

217

(1972).
219 See Reiss, Book Review, 68 Micii. L. REv. 789, 792 (1970); Reiss, Research on Administrative Discretion and justice, 23 J. LvGAL ED. 69, 73 (1970) (footnote omitted): "The
literature on decision-making strongly suggests that an increase in alternatives reduces the
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Although-this explanation has some validity, it is not wholly persuasive. Some administrative agencies have managed to formulate and
publish rules defining the circumstances in which they take summary
action. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has, for example, promulgated rules governing the appointment of conservators. 220 In addition, many agencies have published rules governing the circumstances
in which they initiate adjudicatory proceedings, even though the
criteria are as numerous and the facts as individually diverse as those
involved when summary action is contemplated. Even when an administrative agency is reluctant to formalize its criteria for summary action
in published rules, a useful purpose could still be served by making
these criteria available in other forms, such as summaries of prior
practices, illustrations of real or hypothetical situations at the extremes
of enforcement and nonenforcement, digests of prior decisions to take
summary action, and advisory interpretations. In considering whether
to require a particular agency to promulgate rules governing its discretion in this area, Congress might wisely permit the agency some
freedom to explore the utility of these other forms and methods.
A practical method by which an administrative agency can lay a
foundation for the eventual promulgation of rules or guidelines is to
provide a statement of reasons whenever it takes summary action. This
would permit an agency gradually to develop generalized criteria out
of particular fact situations and to refine them as experience recommends. Once an agency promulgates rules, it will be possible to discern
any discrepancy between the agency's stated criteria for acting and the
reasons given for acting in a particular case.
In authorizing administrative agencies to act summarily, Congress
has only occasionally required that the agency provide a statement of
reasons whenever it does so. 22 1 The Interstate Commerce Act and the
capacity to discriminate among them. This seems to be true for all forms of cognitive
discrimination .... Injustice may arise as much from many rules as it does from a relative
lack of them."
220 12 C.F.R. § 547.1 (1972). The Administrative Conference has recommended that the
Securities and Exchange Commission promulgate rules to govern a process as informal

as the issuance of no-action letters. ADMINISrRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATION No. 19, SEC No-AcrION LLrrEas UNDER S cION 4 OF THE SEcURITIEs ACT
OF 1933, 1 ACUS 437 (1970). See also AnMINisTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATION No. 34, PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE (adopted
June 9, 1972). For suggested statutory language that would have a similar effect on many
areas of informal agency action, see Davis, DiscretionaryJustice, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 56, 60 n.4

(1970).
221 There is no constitutional requirement that administrative agencies state reasons for
their decisions. Compare Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) (suggesting
that due process so requires) with 2 ADMIISTTIVwE LOw TREATISE, supra note 37, § 16.01,
at 436, § 16.04, at 442 and W. GrELLHo.N & C. BYsE, supra note 46, at 979 n.2 (concluding
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various rate suspension statutes modeled after it22 are notable examples

of statutes requiring explanations for each use of summary administrative authority. In most instances the requirement that administrative
agencies state the reasons for their decisions has been of judicial origin,
based both on the desirability of refining the exercise of administra223
tive discretion and on the necessity of facilitating judicial review.
The substantial number of judicial decisions requiring administrative agencies to state the reasons for their decisions are, however,
limited almost entirely to formal agency proceedings. Although the
purposes underlying the requirement of reasons-improvement of the
exercise of discretion and prevention of arbitrary administrative action
-are probably more in need of vindication when an agency acts
informally than when it uses the formal hearing process, courts have
only recently begun to require administrative agencies to provide a
22 4
statement of reasons when they act informally.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 2 5 the court
remanded the case to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency because it found that he had "not yet provided an adequate
explanation for his decision to deny interim relief '22 6 to environmentalist groups seeking the summary suspension of the federal registration
of DDT. The court explicitly instructed the Administrator to identify
the factors he considered in reaching his decision and to relate them to
the evidence before him. 22 7 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.

EPA,2281 the same court remanded a similar case to the Administrator
that the doctrine died in infancy). The Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that
"[a]ll decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions . . . include a
statement of-(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor," does not
apply to summary action; it is limited to instances in which there has been a hearing
required by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 557(a), (c)(3) (1970); see City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374
F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
222 See statutes cited note 15 supra. See also Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(e), 21
U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970); Military Selective Service Act § 22; 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 471a(4) (1971).
223 See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
224 In addition to the two cases discussed in the text, see Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.
Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970).
225 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969).
226 439 F.2d at 596.
227 Id. The court held that findings of fact and statements of reasons would "diminish
the importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process ...." Id. at 598; cf. O'Neil, supra note 39, at 188 (statements of reasons for summary
action likely to increase predictability and consistency in administration).
228 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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because of his failure to provide an adequate statement of reasons: The
court regarded the interests at stake in the case as "too important to
permit the decision to be sustained on the basis of speculative inference
as to what the Administrator's findings and conclusions might have
been" 229 regarding a central issue in the case.
The possibility that the courts will extend the two Environmental
Defense Fund decisions by requiring other administrative agencies to
provide a statement of reasons when they take summary action does
not relieve Congress or the individual administrative agencies of their
respective obligations to address the question of when a statement of
reasons should accompany particular exercises of summary power. The
general usefulness of statements of reasons is so plain that they probably
should be required in most instances of summary action, as they already
are in formal agency adjudication. In some circumstances, of course,
the pressures of time will not permit an agency to prepare a statement
of reasons before taking summary action.23 0 When preparation of a
statement is impractical at the time summary action is taken, the
agency should still be required to provide the statement within a
2 31
specified time subsequent to the action.
Once the decision has been made to require an administrative agency
to provide a statement of reasons when it acts summarily, it is
important that the statement be sufficiently elaborated to permit the
respondent to know the actual basis for the agency's decision and to
plan his subsequent strategy realistically. Statements of reasons that
merely recite statutory phrases ritualistically do not serve this function.
When the Interstate Commerce Commission suspends a proposed rate
schedule, it gives one of six standard reasons-for example, that the
proposed schedule is "unjust and unreasonable in violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act"-each of which merely paraphrases a broad
statutory requirement.232 If the agency issued a statement giving some
Id. at 539.
In both Environmental Defense Fund cases the court required a statement of reasons for administrative decisions not to take summary action-decisions "not ordinarily
... made in a matter of moments, or even hours or days." Id. at 539.
231 Statements of reasons should not be required, of course, where the volume of the
agency's business would prevent it from preparing meaningful statements. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, for example, would have great practical difficulty preparing a
statement of reasons each time it permits one of the hundreds of thousands of proposed
tariffs filed with it annually to take effect without suspension. Situations of this kind are
appropriate exceptions from a blanket requirement that reasons be given for each decision
to take, or not to take, summary action.
232 See Letter from George M. Stafford, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission
to Roger C. Cramton, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, Feb. 28,
1972, at 3 (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
229

230
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sense of its reasoning rather than merely its conclusion, then, as Professor Spritzer has written, "the proponent obviously would be in a
much better position to respond: to abandon the proposal, or particular features of it; to withdraw the pending proposal and submit an
appropriately modified version that might pass muster; or to go forward
with an awareness of the issue or issues that would have to be litigated
to the agency's satisfaction."2- 8
By promulgating rules describing generally the criteria that guide
its discretion in taking summary action and by providing an informative statement of reasons whenever it does act summarily, an administrative agency can make one of its most significant informal processes
more visible. These reforms would be an important step toward
strengthening the fairness of the process by which summary action is
taken. Sunlight, as Justice Brandeis said, is the best of disinfectants. 234
3. PriorInformal Discussions. A fundamental problem of summary
action is the risk of error created when an administrative agency must
act quickly, often on incomplete information, always on information
untested by the adversary process of a hearing. This risk is tolerated
because formal adjudicatory hearings, with their careful, deliberative
consideration of the evidence, are inconsistent with effective governmental action in emergency situations. Informal procedures preceding
the final decision to take summary action can, however, be effective in
reducing the risk of error in what may be a decision with drastic consequences for the individual involved.
Requiring an administrative agency to inform an individual that it
is contemplating summary action against him, to describe the general
nature of its information and the tenor of its reasoning, and to permit
him a brief opportunity to discuss the matter with the agency's staff
and advance arguments why summary action should not be taken could
be most helpful in reducing the risk of error. Warner Gardner, in his
proposed "Informal Procedure Act of 1980," would provide that before
an administrative agency initiates action that "might impose a penalty
or detriment or deny a benefit"-a formulation broad enough to embrace summary action-it must, "to the extent practicable," advise the
persons affected that such action is under consideration and "give them
a reasonable opportunity to supply relevant facts and the reasons why
235
such agency action should or should not be taken."
233 Spritzer, supra note 131, at 61-62.
234 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).

235 Gardner, supra note 203, at 163-64. See also Lockhart, supra note 203, at 194-97. The
only similar provision currently in force, section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1970), is limited to prohibiting an agency from suspending a license
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Despite the absence of any explicit requirement of law, several administrative agencies now follow a general practice of engaging in
informal discussions before taking summary action. The Suspension
Board of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, often
holds informal discussions, usually by telephone, with carriers or their
representatives before deciding whether to suspend proposed tariffs
summarily.28 6 The Food and Drug Administration, prior to instituting
summary seizures, often enters into informal recall discussions 2 7 initiated by firms that have either been informed in writing, as the statute
requires, 28 that an inspector has found violations of law on their
premises or have seen the results, routinely referred to them, of sample
analyses indicating violations of law. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, before summarily suspending trading in a security, often
discusses the matter informally with the company involved and its
counsel, and seeks their cooperation in working out a less drastic
2
method for protecting the public.

9

These practices indicate that it is feasible in some contexts for administrative agencies to inform an individual that summary action is
contemplated and permit him an opportunity for informal discussion
before it is taken. The sound identification of these contexts is crucial;
if prior informal notice is required or given in inappropriate contextsfor example, to a taxpayer suspected of engaging in fraud-the social
consequences may be more severe than the risk of error that notice is
designed to reduce.240 Whether prior notice is appropriate in a particular context is a function of the degree to which the decision to act
summarily depends on an understanding of the facts that may be mistaken; the degree to which the time required to conduct an informal
unless the licensee has been given written notice before institution of proceedings and an
"opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance," except when the "public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise," the classic circumstances in which summary action is

justified. There is no similar constitutional requirement. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
But the decision in Blackwell College of Business v. Attorney Gen., 454 F.2d 928 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), may move in that direction: "[The] wide latitude and discretion inevitably
given to executive officials and adminstrative agencies in regard to enforcement policy puts
upon them a corresponding obligation to institute and abide by procedures that give affected persons a meaningful opportunity, before adverse decisions are crystallized, to make
an appeal to their discretion." Id. at 932.
236 See P. WoLL,supra note 51, at 82-83 (1963); Spritzer, supra note 131, at 55-56.
287 Memorandum from Mary Jane Checchi, supra note 210, at 2.
28 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 704(b), 21 U.S.C. § 374(b) (1970).
289 See Nelson, Discussions with Agency Staff Representatives Before Adjudicatory Hearings Commence, 12 AD. L. BuL_. 41 (1959); Woll, The Development of Shortened Procedure in American Administrative Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 56, 70-71 (1959).
240 Cf. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1939).
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prior discussion would reduce the effectiveness of any summary action
eventually taken; and the volume of business and amount of staff time
241
that a practice of prior notice and informal discussion would involve.
Quite plainly, these considerations cannot be applied at large, but they
can be applied on a particularized basis, agency-by-agency and functionby-function.
Similarly, the specific shape that informal discussions should takehow complete a description of its evidence and outline of its reasons
the agency should provide, whether the individual may submit documentary evidence, affidavits, or a written statement in the nature of a
brief, for how long a period the discussions should be permitted-will
necessarily vary with the particular agency and the particular summary
power involved.242 Resolution of these questions may have to reflect
the varying degree to which informal discussions between staff and the
individual against whom summary action is contemplated may become
a process of detailed negotiation into which the members of the agency,
who have the ultimate power of decision, will be improperly drawn.24 8
Again, the seriousness of that danger and its implications for a practice
of informal discussions prior to taking summary action must be individ2 44
ually assessed by and for each agency exercising summary authority.
The evident desirability of particularized adaptations to a norm of
informal discussion prior to taking summary action indicates caution
in enacting legislation. For many agencies, statutory prescription would
be premature, particularly if they have not employed informal procedures of prior discussion in the past. These agencies should first-or
should first be required to-devise and adopt informal discussion procedures tailored to reducing the risk of error created by the specific type
of summary authority they exercise. Experience with the varying procedures that doubtless can be devised may then supply a basis for informed legislative action.
4. Expedited Hearings.The prolonged delay that sometimes occurs
between the time an agency takes summary action and the time an
adjudicated hearing is held is one of the most egregious consequences
of the failure to structure the use of summary authority. In Gonzalez v.
241 See Lockhart, supra note 203, at 195.
242 For useful suggestions in particular contexts, see, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321
US. 414, 428 (1944); National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 306 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1962); COMM'N
ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcuTrrv BRANCH OF Tra GOVERNmENT, supra note 150, at
146-48; Freeman, supra note 148, at 894-95.
243 Compare Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) with Public Util. Comm'n v.
United States, 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
244 See Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Ass'n v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 144 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 US. 828 (1971).
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Freeman,245 for example, the Secretary of Agriculture's summary order
debarring a businessman from eligibility for certain government contracts on account of alleged misuse of official inspection certificates
remained in effect for twenty-eight months without a hearing being
held. In Aquavella v. Richardson,246 the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare's summary order suspending medicare payments to a
nursing home remained in effect for eighteen months without a hearing
being held. In Beacon FederalSavings & Loan Associationv. FHLBB,247
the Board's summary order appointing a Supervisory Representative in
Charge of a banking institution remained in effect for five months
before a hearing was held and fourteen months before the Board
adopted the hearing examiner's recommended decision.
The justification for summary action, as an exception to the general
rule that an administrative agency may act against an individual only
after granting him a hearing, lies in the necessity for the government
to act immediately if public policy is to be enforced at all. Having
invoked the exception to achieve its immediate objectives, an administrative agency has an obligation in fairness to hold an adjudicatory
hearing promptly so that the adverse impact of its summary order on
the individual will be confined to the shortest possible period. 2 Congress should take steps to insure that this obligation is met.
One step Congress could take would be to require that all federal
agencies taking summary action expedite the subsequent adjudicatory
hearing in every way consistent with sound administrative resolution
245 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
246 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971).
247 162 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1958), appeal dismissed, 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 861 U.S. 823 (1959).
248 See Home Bros. Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (hearings ordered within
a specified number of days); Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862, 864 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, 960 (1971); Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297
F. Supp. 416, 420 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970) (hearing
ordered "at the earliest practical time'). One court has suggested that if the delay is "too
long to be justifiable," the action "must be regarded as unlawful during the delay." La
Bonte v. Berlin, 85 N.H. 89, 95, 154 A. 89, 93 (1931). The unfairness caused by prolonged
delay may ultimately assume constitutional dimensions if, as Judge Wyzanski recently said,
the due process guarantee of a prior administrative hearing "may be validly limited [by
summary action] only for the briefest of periods." United States v. Harper, 335 F. Supp.
904, 906-07 (D. Mass. 1971), vacated as moot, 406 U.S. 940 (1972); cf. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972): "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around threeday, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the
State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent
severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate
form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to prior hearing of some kind."
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of the issues presented. Some federal statutes presently contain provisions mandating expedited administrative hearings after summary
action has been taken. 249 Institutional considerations, however, may
stand in the path of their effectiveness. Once an administrative agency
has taken summary action, it is no longer under immediate pressure to
resolve the matter in dispute. Summary action places the pressure for
an expedited adjudicatory hearing on the individual; he must persuade
the agency to grant him a prompt hearing, while the agency is probably
content with the status quo. A statutory requirement of expedition may
not be sufficient to alter this balance of pressures. Moreover, even when
an agency is prepared to grant an expedited hearing, whether or not
it is required by statute to do so, the individual will often be unable
to take advantage of it because of the disabling injury that the agency's
exercise of summary authority will have inflicted 2 0 and the limitations
that expedition imposes on the development of complex issues.
As an alternative to requiring an expedited hearing following summary action, Congress could provide that summary orders would be
effective for only limited periods of time. Such provisions must obviously be tailored on an agency-by-agency, function-by-function basis.
Congress has already demonstrated the capacity to make individualized
judgments of this sort. Summary orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission suspending trading in a security, for example, are limited
by the Securities Exchange Act to ten days' duration. 251 Summary orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission suspending proposed tariffs
are effective for seven months; if the Commission has not ruled upon
the validity of the proposed tariffs by the expiration of that period, the
252
carrier is free to put them into effect.
By giving an agency an incentive to move forward to completion of
an adjudicatory hearing, statutory provisions limiting the effective
periods of summary orders may be more effective than statutory requirements of expedition in reducing the incidence of prolonged
delays. Limitation provisions would distribute the pressures to proceed
249 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 4(c), 7 U.S.C. § 155b(c)
(1970); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 404, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).
250 See text at notes 162-65 supra:
251

§ 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(4) (1970); § 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5) (1970). But

the Commission often "tacks" one ten-day suspension period onto another if it determines
that circumstances require continuation of the suspension period. See 5 L. Loss, supra note
172, at 2814-15. The question whether such a procedure has been endorsed by Congress,
or rather is an evasion of its limited duration requirement, is discussed id. at 2825.
252 Interstate Commerce Act § 15(7), 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970); see Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 872 U.S. 658 (1963).
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to an adjudicatory hearing more equally between the agency and the
individual, creating a common interest in expedition that may not exist
2
if the statute simply directs an expedited hearing.

53

The effectiveness of limitation provisions in reducing prolonged
delays may sometimes be secured, however, at the expense of other
values. When an administrative agency would be unable to hold an
adjudicatory hearing promptly because it lacks the staff and resources
to complete its investigation and prepare its case adequately in the
limited time available, a difficult choice confronts it. It may choose not
to act summarily, even though it is convinced that the public interest
so requires. Provisions limiting the effective periods of summary orders
may thus compel an agency to make more selective use of a remedy
already restricted to emergency situations.2 54 Or, in order to protect
the public interest for the limited period that its order can have effect,
an agency may choose to act summarily anyway, inflicting injury on an
individual who it knows will not receive an opportunity to contest the
merits before the order expires. Even if not prohibited by statutory
provisions limiting the effective periods of summary orders, the latter
course consists uneasily with the constitutional theory allowing summary action on condition that the individual have an adequate opportunity for a subsequent adjudicatory hearing. It also permits the
individual, when the statutory period of limitation expires, to resume
the very conduct that threatened the public interest sufficiently to
require summary action in the first place.
These considerations suggest that Congress should impose statutory
limitations on the effective periods of summary orders-rather than
limiting itself to requiring expedited hearings-only after a particularized examination of the agency and function involved. Congress need
not, of course, prescribe the specific period of limitation in order to
adopt the principle that particular summary orders should be of limited
duration. But it should at least require the agencies to provide by rule
for reasonable but specific periods of limitation, just as some agencies
have promulgated rules requiring hearing examiners, for example, to
65.07 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing FED. R.
253 Compare 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcncE
Crv. P. 65 (b)).
254 Congress might mitigate the impact that limiting the effective period of summary
orders might have on enforcement policy and practice by providing that an agency need
only commence an adjudicatory hearing to toll the limitation. Assuming the agency did
not prolong the hearing unnecessarily, the summary order would then remain in effect
until the hearing was completed. Such a provision would create an incentive for the
agency to move expeditiously to a hearing (although inadequacies of staff and resources
could still prevent it from acting) and yet permit a more deliberative hearing than could
be conducted within the limitation period.
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file their initial decisions within a specified number of days after the
record is completed. 255 Engaging the responsibility of agencies on
matters of this kind is almost always a wise and practical course.
C. Judicial Review of Summary Action
Congress has only rarely exercised its power 256 to permit 257 or preclude258 judicial review of summary administrative action. The absence
from most statutes of a clear expression of Congress's intention has
compelled the courts to decide the question of the availability of judicial review for themselves, to strike a careful balance between the need
for adequate protection of individual interests and the need for effective and responsible administrative action. In so doing, they have sought
guidance from various sources and considerations, including the common law presumption of the reviewability of administrative action; 259
inferences, drawn from the statutory scheme, of a legislative intention
to preclude judicial review; 260 the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; 261 the appropriateness of the issues for judicial
resolution; 262 the seriousness of the impact of the agency's action on
the individual; 263 and the disruption and interference that judicial
264
review would create in the administrative process.
Because Congress does have the power to legislate in this area, however, the fact that courts have heretofore played a prominent role in
determining the availability of judicial review does not conclude the
matter. Congress has an independent obligation to consider the role
that judicial review should play in insuring that summary authority is
fairly exercised.
255 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.51(a) (1972) (Federal Trade Commission). See also Gellhom
& Robinson, supra note 171, at 621 n.48.
256 See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236, 245 (1848).
257 See, e.g., Federal Meat Inspection Act §§ 402-03, 21 U.S.C. §§ 672-73 (1970).
258 National Housing Act § 407(k)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(2) (1970); Hykel v. Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
259 See 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, supra note 37, § 28.04; L. JAMFE, supra note 66,
at 336-53.
260 See, e.g., Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963); Port of N.Y. Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 41
U.S.L.W. 3346 (Dec. 18, 1972).
261 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (1970).
262 See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
263 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Aquavella v. Richardson,
437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971).
264 See Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151, rev'g on rehearing
en banc 435 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971);
Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 262 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1958).
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The specific contexts in which summary powers are exercised are so
various that a single, undifferentiated response-for example, enactment of a statute of general application or amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act to permit or preclude judicial review of all
summary action-would be impractical. Permitting judicial review of
all summary action might hardly interfere with some administrative
processes but seriously disrupt others; precluding any judicial review
might expose individuals to injuries harsh and senseless in some contexts but quite justifiable in others. Legislative decisions concerning
judicial review of summary action can be made wisely only on an
2
agency-by-agency, function-by-function basis.

65

In making these decisions, Congress should take into account not
only the factors that courts have considered relevant in determining
the availability of judicial review but also other considerations that,
although not often expressed in judicial opinions, have probably influenced the results courts have reached. First among these is the confidence that Congress itself has in an agency's competence and sensitivity
in exercising summary authority.266 If Congress is uncertain about a
particular agency's capacity to exercise summary authority fairly, it
should consider whether the availability of judicial review would motivate the agency to a higher standard of performance. Second, the probable effectiveness of judicial review in preventing unnecessary injury
to an individual against whom summary action has been taken must be
weighed realistically in evaluating the advisability of providing for
review of particular types of summary action. Judicial review may not
be effective, for example, where summary action may wrongfully inflict
irremediable damage,2 67 or where the court pays great deference to

administrative expertise, as it is likely to do in scientific and technical
areas.2 68 If judicial review would not be effective in protecting the

individual, it may as well be precluded and judicial resources conserved.
There is much to be said for leaving the entire question of judicial
review of summary action to the courts, particularly if agencies adopt
265 Cf. Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 546,
571-75 (1969).
266 Cf. 1 F. CoopER, STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 141 (1965): "A court that views with

doubts and misgivings the functioning of a given agency is naturally inclined to repress
that agency's freedom of discretionary action."
267 See SEC v. Jones, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); J. LANDIs, supra note 13, at 108-09; Conference
on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. lAW. 793, 902 (1967) (remarks
of Friendly, J.).
268 See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1969); Spivak, Regulation of
Medical Devices, 400 ANNALS 82, 88 (1972); Note, The Role of the Courts in Technology
Assessment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 873 & n.77 (1970); cf. Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv.. 40 (1901).
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effective administrative procedures for protecting the individual.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have focused on the role of
26 9
summary action and the timing of judicial review in our legal system,
stimulating reconsideration of problems the relevant dimensions of
which may not yet have fully been perceived. Codification of existing
principles of judicial review of summary action might prematurely
restrict the courts' resourcefulness in fashioning wise solutions to these
problems. In addition, the courts are probably better situated institutionally than Congress to appreciate the factors relevant to a decision
to review specific forms of summary action and to see those factors in
the larger context of social values that a system of judicial review is
270
designed to serve.
Judicial review is not adequate by itself, however, to prevent abuses
in the exercise of summary authority. It can stop agencies from carrying
out unwise decisions to act summarily and can protect individuals from
additional injury, but it cannot insure that agency decisions to act summarily are wisely made. Conscientious administrators who appreciate
the responsibilities of their power are likely to serve that ideal better
than judges exercising the function of judicial review. "Constitute
government how you please," wrote Edmund Burke, "infinitely the
greater part of it must depend upon.., the prudence and uprightness
271
of ministers of state."
III.

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTIONS

AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO

SUMMARY ACTION

A significant alternative to granting an administrative agency authority to act summarily is to empower it to seek a preliminary injunction
from a United States district court pending completion of the administrative proceedings.2 7

2

A preliminary injunction serves the same basic

purpose as a summary administrative order: it permits an agency to
act at what may be the only point in time at which effective action can
269 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 US. 136 (1967).
270 See L. JAFFE, supra note 66, at 827; cf. Parker, The Execution of Administrative
Acts, 24 U. CH. L. REv. 292 (1957); Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary
Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLum. L. REv. 1293 (1972).
271 1 E. BumRE, Woaas 879 (rev. ed. 1865) (orig. ed. 1770).
272 See Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal
Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1028 (1948). See also 0. FIss, INJUNCTIONS 168-86 (1972). As to
whether an administrative agency may obtain a preliminary injunction from a federal
court without express statutory authorization, compare, e.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404
U.S. 138 (1971) and FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) with EEOC v. WVoolco
Dep't Store, 821 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1971); see Note, Interim Injunctive Relief Pending
Administrative Determination,49 CoLU.m. L. REv. 1124 (1949).
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be taken. Like a summary order, a preliminary injunction can prevent
a possible violation of law from occurring until an administrative hearing on the merits can be held; and by preserving the status quo, it can
preserve an agency's jurisdiction eventually to enter an order vindicating the public interest.
Congress has granted several agencies authority to seek preliminary
injunctions pending completion of administrative proceedings in situations in which it has denied them authority to act summarily.2 3 The
National Labor Relations Board, for example, has the authority under
the Taft-Hartley Act to seek injunctive relief pending the disposition
of administrative hearings in two circumstances: "upon issuance of a
complaint... charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging
in an unfair labor practice"; 274 and whenever there is "reasonable cause
to believe" that a union is engaged in a boycott or an illegal strike.27 5
The Board has rarely used its discretionary authority to seek preliminary injunctions against unfair labor practices, 27 6 but it has invoked
the mandatory injunction section against coercive union activities on
thousands of occasions. 277 The Federal Trade Commission also has
authority to seek preliminary injunctions-against dissemination of
false advertising relating to foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, 27 8 and
against violations of a number of labeling laws 2 7 9 -pending completion
of cease and desist order proceedings. The Commission has made
2 °
sparing use of this authority. 8
273 Some agencies have been granted authority to seek injunctive relief against
persons believed to be violating the law as part of statutory schemes contemplating that
a judicial hearing on permanent relief, rather than an administrative hearing, will
follow. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Federal Power

Act § 314, 16 U.S.C. § 825m(a) (1970); Interstate Commerce Act § 222, 49 U.S.C. § 322(b)
(1970); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4-5, amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a)-(g), (j) (1970). The Food and Drug Administration, however, has

been granted a choice of judicial or summary administrative remedies when certain
violations of law occur. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 302, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1970)
(preliminary injunction); id. § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970) (libel); Drug Abuse Control
Amendments of 1965 § 8(a), 21 U.S.C. § 372(e) (1970) (executive seizure).
274 National Labor Relations Act § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970).

275 Id. § 10(), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
276 See 1970 NLR.B ANN. REP. 126; ADvIsoRY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
LAw, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE N.L.R.B., S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1960); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rlv. 58, 129 (1964); Note, NLRB Power
to Award Damages in Unfair Labor PracticeCases, 84 HRv.L. REv. 1670, 1671 n.12 (1971).
277 See 1970 NLRB ANN. REP. 130.
278 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
279 Wool Products Labeling Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 68e (1970); Fur Products Labeling

Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 69g (1970); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act § 8, 15 U.S.C.
§ 70f (1970); Flammable Fabrics Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1195 (1970).
280 See Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
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Given the similarity in basic purpose of preliminary injunctions and
summary administrative orders, what considerations should Congress
take into account in choosing between them? When Congress grants an
administrative agency authority to seek a preliminary injunction rather
than to act summarily, it indicates a preference for certain fundamental
values that the federal judiciary is designed to preserve and declines
to subordinate those values to the regulatory needs of the agency. A
legislative choice of the preliminary injunction model conforms with
the norm of our society that the coercive power of government should
not be applied until an impartial judge has confirmed that the proposed
action is lawful. By obliging an administrative agency with a specialized
regulatory mission to justify its contemplated action to a generalist
court of law, a preliminary injunction proceeding permits a range of
legal and social values wider than mere regulatory necessity to inform
the decision. And by formalizing a process of decision that would otherwise be informal-by placing it in a public forum and (except when a
temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte) by granting notice
to the individual who will be affected-a preliminary injunction proceeding may tend to reduce the risk of error 28 ' and the possibility of
excessive coercion. 282 Finally, an individual against whom a preliminary
injunction has been entered has a right to judicial review, a substantial
Advertising, 16 Bus. LAw. 81, 88 (1960). The Commission recently sought a temporary
injunction for the first time in 10 years. See FTC v. Medi-Hair Int'l Corp., 3 TaDE REG.
19,478 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 11, 1971); cf. Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal
REP.
Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 551 (1964).
281 It is sometimes suggested that a preliminary injunction is capable of greater
definition, precision, and discrimination than a summary order and is therefore less
likely to err by overbreadth. This suggestion is difficult to maintain as a general proposition, although it more obviously may be true of a permanent injunction issued after a

full hearing. Because injunctions are enforceable by contempt proceedings, however,
courts are likely to be more concerned than are agencies acting summarily with ensuring
that the terms of their decrees are no "broader than . . . necessary to prevent evasion."
Comment, supra note 272, at 1051.
282 The coercive impact of summary administrative orders and preliminary injunctions
alike is often intensified as the period during which they remain in effect, not infrequently
a year or more, lengthens. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 621-22, 634-35
(1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting); FTC v. National Health Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 840, 846
(D. Md. 1952). Delay by an administrative agency after it has obtained a preliminary
injunction "may make it seem that judicial restraint and administrative non-action are
combining to enforce a judicial rather than an administrative settlement of the dispute,
contrary to the manifest intention of Congress." Douds v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers
Int'l Ass'n, 245 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1957). Although an individual subject to a summary
administrative order can petition a court to accelerate the proceeding, see Goldman,
Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1423 (1968), courts may well
be readier to control the duration of their own orders, vacating preliminary injunctions
on grounds of administrative delay, than to set aside an agency's summary order because
the agency has let too much time pass without a hearing.
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protection not always available when an administrative agency acts
summarily.
There are practical considerations, however, that may temper the
advantages Congress can achieve by authorizing an administrative
agency to seek a preliminary injunction rather than to act summarily.
It is surely true, although not capable of precise proof, that a symbolism
attaches to the choices Congress makes in distributing power among
governmental institutions. A decision to permit an administrative
agency to take summary action in emergency situations-without requiring it to seek the approval of a court-is a demonstration of Congress's faith in the agency's maturity and judgment. By thus indicating
its confidence in an agency, Congress enhances its stature and enables
it to act with increased authority. Conversely, by denying an agency
the authority to act summarily and requiring it instead to seek a preliminary injunction from a court, Congress may impair the agency's
stature and encourage the regulated industry to deny the agency the
respect necessary to promote its regulatory effectiveness.
In addition, whenever the effectiveness of a regulatory response turns
on its promptness, a preliminary injunction may be less effective than
a summary administrative order. The Federal Trade Commission, for
example, generally requires at least a week to bring before a judge an
application for a preliminary injunction against false advertising.
Before the Commission can go to court, it must prepare an order to
show cause, a petition for relief, affidavits by scientific experts, a memorandum of law, and a final order for the court to sign. 28 3 When the
application is made in a court outside Washington, the Commission
must enlist the assistance of the local United States Attorney, who may
want a day or two to examine the papers before signing them and may
require some persuading if he is reluctant to proceed.2 814 By the time
that the Commission has completed this preparatory work, an unlawful
advertising campaign may have been successful in achieving its desired
effect.
Even when an agency's application for a preliminary injunction receives a preferred place on a court calendar, the court may not be able
to issue an injunction until several days after the time at which the
283 Interview with Harold D. Rhynedance, Jr., Assistant General Counsel, Federal
Trade Commission, in Washington, D.C., Feb., 1971.
284 See Comment, supra note 272, at 1035 n-51. The preparatory process may be even
longer for an agency that must have the approval of the Attorney General before going
to court. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); FTC v.
Guignon, 390 F.2d 323, 336 (8th Cir. 1968).
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agency could have issued a summary order. If substantial evidentiary
support is required, the court may need a longer period to reach a
decision. 28 5 If the court denies the injunction, more time must pass
while the agency takes an appeal; or if it grants the injunction, the
respondent may appeal. In either event, the requirement that the
agency obtain a preliminary injunction prevents it from responding
with the promptness and certainty of success that the authority to act
summarily would permit. It is indeed possible that the cumulative
effect of these factors may sometimes discourage an agency from seeking
a preliminary injunction when it would unhesitatingly issue a summary
order if it had the authority to do so, an inhibiting effect that Congress
must consider in deciding whether to authorize an agency to proceed
by means of a preliminary injunction rather than a summary administrative order.
It should be noted that the process by which some administrative
agencies decide to take summary action may itself be quite extended.
The Food and Drug Administration, for example, sometimes requires
several weeks to process a field representative's recommendation that
summary seizures be instituted, particularly when the recommendation
raises scientific questions requiring extensive laboratory analysis and
legal and policy evaluation. 28 When an administrative agency requires
considerable time to take summary action after an unlawful condition
comes to its attention, Congress should consider whether the preliminary injunction procedure is not the more appropriate method of
regulation, since it is difficult to maintain that an "emergency" justify28 7
ing summary action exists in such circumstances.
While Congress can grant an administrative agency the authority to
act summarily only when an "emergency" exists in the constitutional
sense, there is no analogous constitutional limitation on Congress's
power to authorize an administrative agency to seek a preliminary injunction. This consideration may make preliminary injunctions more
attractive in some contexts. In Angle v. Sacks, 288 for example, the court

held that the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the National Labor Relations
285 See Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85
HAgv. L. REv.477, 486--87 (1971).
286 Memorandum from Mary Jane Checchi, supra note 210, at 7-8.
287 Cf. Angle v. Sacks, 982 F.2d 655, 661 (10th Cir. 1967): "The more time that elapses
between the time the incidents occur the less effective injunctive relief becomes, and it
becomes increasingly difficult to show it to be a 'just and proper' remedy. This could, of
course, reach a point where relief should be denied on that ground alone."
288 Id. Although the court was interpreting the meaning of statutory language, its
reasoning necessarily governs the constitutional question.
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Board to seek a preliminary injunction when it had "reasonable cause
to believe that unfair labor practices had occurred."28 9 The court rejected the argument that the Board's discretion to seek such relief
should be limited to "rare emergency situations" that endanger the
national welfare or have "'heavy and meaningful repercussions' [for]
a demonstrably prejudicial impact on the public." 290 Congress is thus
free to authorize an administrative agency to seek a preliminary injunction when it would be prohibited constitutionally from authorizing it
to act summarily.
In addition to being more widely available than summary action,
preliminary injunctions authorized by statute are a more flexible
remedy than preliminary injunctions resting on the general equity
powers of courts. It is familiar teaching that a court will not grant a
preliminary injunction without a clear showing that the petitioner
has no adequate remedy at law; that he will probably succeed at an
eventual trial on the merits; that he will suffer irreparable injury unless
the preliminary injunction is granted; and that the injury he will
sustain if relief is denied is greater than the injury others will suffer
if it is granted. But Congress is not bound by the traditional criteria
of equity courts in setting the conditions on which a court may grant a
preliminary injunction authorized by statute. It may relax these standards if it determines that the acts prohibited by the statute are sufficiently serious to warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction on a
less persuasive demonstration. 291
The National Labor Relation Act, for example, authorizes the courts
to grant the Board such equitable relief against unfair labor practices
"as [the court] deems just and proper."292 In construing this conclusory
phrase, courts have held that the Board is entitled to a preliminary injunction upon demonstrating "a reasonable apprehension that the
efficacy of the Board's final order may be nullified, or the administrative
procedures will be rendered meaningless" 293 unless temporary relief is
granted. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that
the FTC may obtain a preliminary injunction against certain types of
289

Id. at 659.

290

Id.

291 See, e.g., SEC v. Jones, 85 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936) (lack of
adequate remedy at law need not be alleged); Henderson v. Burd, 13 F.2d 515 (2d
Cir. 1943) (irreparable injury need not be shown). For criticism of relaxing the traditional
requirements of equity in certain circumstances, see Developments in the Law-Inunctions, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 994, 1059 (1965).
292 § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970).
293 Angle v. Sacks, 382 F-2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967); see NLR.B v. Aerovox Corp.,
889 F.2d 475, 476-77 (4th Cir. 1967); Elliot v. Dubois Chemicals, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 1, 2-3
(N.D. Tex. 1962).
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false advertising on a "proper showing" that it has "reason to believe"
the advertising violates the law. 294 In FTC v. Rhodes PharmacalCo.,295

the court held that an injunction should issue under the statute, without
regard to the existence of debatable issues of fact, if the Commission
demonstrated "a justifiable basis for believing, derived from reasonable
inquiry or other credible information, that such a state of facts probably existed as reasonably would lead the Commission to believe that
the defendants were engaged in the dissemination of false advertise296
ments of a drug in violation of the Act."
Two considerations suggest the wisdom of a legislative decision to
relax the burden of proof that an administrative agency must meet to
obtain a preliminary injunction. First, modifications in the agency's
burden of proof that relieve it from certain evidentiary obligations can
increase its opportunity to obtain expeditious relief from the courts.
Second, the less demanding the burden of proof that an agency must
meet, particularly on the traditional equity standard regarding its likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the more remote the possibility that
its decision to seek a preliminary injunction will appear to commit itor will in fact commit it-to a position "at odds with its subsequent
supposed impartiality when called upon to decide the case on its
merits."

29 7

When Congress permits an administrative agency to obtain a preliminary injunction by meeting a relaxed burden of proof, it reduces
proportionately the scope of an equity court's traditional authority.
Congress has not yet chosen to restrict that authority drastically; but by
sufficiently modifying the traditional requirements of equity, Congress
could enable an administrative agency to obtain a preliminary injunction almost as readily as it could take summary action, particularly
when account is taken of the courts' tendency to defer to the judgment
of agencies seeking statutory injunctions. 298 This approach may at first

seem appealing. In comparison to summary action it places only mar294

§ 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970).

191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 747-48. But see FTC v. National Health Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340, 346
(D. Md. 1952); Note, supra note 285, at 486-87 n.54.
297 Elman, supra note 157, at 811 (footnote omitted).
298 See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 879 U.S. 378, 383 (1965); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944). Compare Brown v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 218 F.2d
542, 544 (9th Cir. 1954) (Pope, J., concurring): ("[T]he area for the exercise of the traditional discretion not to grant an injunction is much more limited" in the presence of a
statute.) with FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 677 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Not even the
Commission contends that... the judge is merely a rubber stamp, stripped of the power
to exercise independent judgment on the issue of the Commission's 'reason to be295

296

lieve.' ").
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ginally greater restraints on an agency's capacity to act effectively, yet
it grants the individual an opportunity to contest the agency's proposed
action before a judge. But its implications are disquieting. Narrowing
the scope of the court's authority so severely would compromise the
fundamental values that justify requiring resort to the courts for the
judicial remedy of a preliminary injunction in the first place. By purchasing the appearance of judicial participation without providing its
substance, this approach would diminish the stature of the federal
courts and trifle with their prestige.
These judgments do not counsel Congress against modifying the traditional equity standards for issuance of preliminary injunctions when
greater flexibility than they permit is appropriate. They do suggest,
however, that if Congress chooses to authorize an administrative agency
to seek a preliminary injunction rather than grant it summary authority, it should preserve for the courts a role that draws upon, rather than
compromises, their special strengths and historic authority.
Tm

CHALLENGE OF SUMMARY ACTION

Fair administrative procedure most often results when Congress and
the administrative agencies share with the courts the responsibility for
creating it. The Administrative Procedure Act has been successful in
achieving greater fairness in the formal processes of adjudication and
rule making because Congress, in drafting its central provisions, struck
a workable balance between prescribing fundamental principles of fair
procedure and permitting administrative agencies freedom to adapt
these principles creatively to the disparate patterns of their regulatory
responsibilities.
A challenge of the character that the draftsmen of the Administrative
Procedure Act faced in 1946 now confronts those concerned with the
fairness of the informal, discretionary processes of administrative
agencies. Although the importance of informal agency action has been
recognized for a generation, only recently have students of the administrative process begun to suggest systematic approaches to understanding its nature.
Of the many informal processes that administrative agencies engage
in, summary action is particularly appropriate for thoughtful study.
As an exception to the general constitutional norm that government
may not act against an individual before it has granted him a hearing,
it has the competence to permit effective governmental action in emergency situations as well as the capacity wrongfully to inflict serious
injury. Yet its exercise is almost wholly free of administrative regulations or formalized agency practices. The Supreme Court has recently
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begun to reexamine and refine the constitutional principles governing
the area. Summary action, in short, is ripe for contemporary consideration. One can hope, as Professor Frankfurter wrote of his generation's
quest to understand the administrative process, that "efforts at system'299
atization may themselves be creative forces.
299 F. FRANKFURTER & J. DAvisoN, CASES AND OTHER MATERLUAS ON ADMInAIVE LAw
viii (1932).

